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Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the 
Growth of the Global Securities Class Action 
Under the Dutch WCAM 
STEVEN MCNAMARA† 
ABSTRACT 
In 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally reset the 
jurisdictional sweep of U.S. securities law in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank. No longer could foreign plaintiffs access the U.S. 
courts if a defendant engaged in conduct in the U.S. affecting 
securities prices outside the U.S., or conduct outside the U.S. had a 
significant effect on securities prices inside the U.S. Under 
Morrison’s new “transactional test” only purchasers of securities on 
a U.S. exchange or in a U.S. transaction would be able to bring 
securities fraud claim under Section 10(b). The Morrison decision 
therefore greatly heightens the importance of alternative non-U.S. 
jurisdictions hosting securities fraud lawsuits. Prior to Morrison, 
however, the Netherlands had already begun to host global 
securities settlements under its statute allowing for the settlement 
of mass claims, the Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade 
(WCAM). As of 2019, the WCAM has been used to settle global 
securities fraud claims in four major cases, including the 1.2 billion 
euro settlement in the Fortis case, the largest ever outside the 
United States. The WCAM differs in crucial ways from the U.S. 
securities fraud class action regime, however. Most importantly, 
because the WCAM does not afford plaintiff shareholders a 
collective means to sue, the balance of power shifts decisively 
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towards the defendant as compared to the American system. A close 
look at Morrison and the WCAM settlements to date illustrates that 
to some extent the development of this law is an example of 
regulatory competition. Indeed, both the U.S. Supreme Court and 
the Dutch courts have understood their role as affording differing, 
though complementary, systems for solving securities fraud claims. 
The theory of regulatory competition is not the only cause driving 
the development of a global class action mechanism under Dutch 
law, however. The jurisprudential commitments of the Supreme 
Court’s conservative wing, as well as principles of justice and the 
workings of chance, have also shaped the development of this new 
body of law. This Article surveys the WCAM as a mechanism to 
settle securities fraud claims, with an eye towards comparing it to 
its American counterpart. While critics of the American system will 
be heartened by the fact that plaintiffs are deprived of the ability to 
launch in terrorem litigation, the Dutch system fails to improve on 
the more trenchant flaws of the American securities fraud class 
action regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 decision in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank shut the U.S. Federal 
courthouse doors to securities fraud lawsuits on behalf of 
shareholders purchasing securities in foreign transactions.1 
As a result, interest in foreign alternatives to the U.S. 
securities fraud class action on the part of would-be plaintiffs 
and their legal representatives has increased greatly. While 
a number of jurisdictions have provisions allowing for mass 
claims to be brought before their courts, none of them have 
the complete list of factors that make securities class actions 
viable in the United States: opt-out class rules, the 
possibility of substantial monetary damages, the American 
rule for litigation funding (i.e., no “loser pays” or English rule 
cost-shifting for unsuccessful plaintiffs), and the fraud-on-
the-market standard for demonstrating reliance on a 
defendant’s statements.2 Furthermore, of the jurisdictions 
that do allow an opt-out mass action in a securities claim, 
only the Netherlands has hosted truly global settlements 
under something approaching an American-style class action 
mechanism.  
While Morrison heightens the importance of the Dutch 
statute allowing for the settlement of mass claims, its use in 
securities cases actually predates Morrison. The Wet 
Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade (the WCAM) was 
enacted in 2005, and was first used in a securities settlement 
in Shell Petroleum in 2007.3 Since then, three more securities 
settlements have been concluded under the WCAM, with the 
ongoing Petrobras action as another potential settlement. 
 
 1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 2. See John C. Coffee, The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, 
Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1896–97 (2017); Deborah R. 
Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party 
Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307–08 (2011).  
 3. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell 
Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum] 
(translated by author). See infra notes 121–48 and accompanying text. 
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While only five in total, these actions are of major 
importance. At 1.2 billion euros Fortis is the largest 
securities settlement ever outside the U.S. The value of a 
Petrobras settlement would likely exceed that, as the U.S. 
action settled for $2.95 billion in 2018.4 Enough securities 
cases have now been settled under the WCAM to establish it 
as a potential alternative to the American class action where 
plaintiffs can no longer access American courts. That said, 
the specific requirements of the WCAM shift the leverage in 
a settlement negotiation decisively towards the defendants, 
so many cases that would have otherwise been viable under 
American law will fail to settle under the Dutch statute. The 
WCAM does not offer a clean replacement or substitute for 
the American class action but rather a more limited 
mechanism that gives a conclusive effect to a settlement 
otherwise reached by the parties. 
The fact that the WCAM offers a more limited avenue to 
plaintiffs suggests the central question this Article will 
explore: Given the extensively documented flaws of the 
American securities fraud class action, to what extent does 
the WCAM represent an improvement over its American 
counterpart? Does the WCAM avoid at least some of the 
problems that call the efficacy of the American securities 
class action regime into question while at the same time 
offering real benefits to investors and corporations? At first 
glance, critics of the American class action may be heartened 
by the fact that the Dutch procedure does not offer a class-
wide cause of action, thereby depriving would-be plaintiffs 
and their legal representatives of the ability to launch in 
terrorem litigation designed solely to extract a settlement. 
The WCAM does shift leverage to the defendants, often 
decisively, in the settlement negotiations that will precede 
any legal proceedings in the Amsterdam Court of Appeals. 
On the other hand, simply shifting advantage to the 
 
 4. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 317 F. Supp. 3d 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 
784 Fed. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2019). 
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defendants, which critics would presumably think a good 
thing, does not address the more trenchant criticisms of the 
American class action. These center around circularity: due 
to the unique structural features of the American securities 
class action, any remedy it affords generally involves one 
group of shareholders compensating another group. This is 
because in a securities class action, one class of shareholders, 
generally the long-term, “buy and hold” investors, pays for a 
damage award going to shareholders, often short-term 
traders, who bought or sold shares during the class period. 
And in addition to circularity, up to 50% of the total cost of 
administering this remedy will go to the legal fees of 
plaintiffs’ and defense counsel. While the problems of a 
circular remedy and expensive legal fees are central to the 
criticism of the American class action, they are not the only 
legitimate complaints. Also important are questions 
concerning the efficacy of any deterrent effect the current 
regime might have and the incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers 
in these cases. 
Surveying Morrison and the recent settlements 
concluded under the WCAM, this Article comes to the 
following conclusions: First, the WCAM offers only a limited 
improvement upon the American securities fraud class 
action. While offering plaintiffs only a settlement mechanism 
and not a cause of action greatly reduces the ability of 
plaintiffs to launch “strike suits,” the fundamental 
circularity embodied in the American class action remains. 
From an economic standpoint, then, the Dutch synthetic 
class action represents only a crude sort of improvement over 
the American class action. It greatly reduces the incidence of 
vexatious litigation, but any settlement concluded will still 
be essentially circular. And in radically reducing the amount 
of cases, the Dutch regime does away with the compensatory 
and other benefits that those settlements do provide in the 
U.S., whatever their flaws. Secondly, its deterrent effect is 
subject to the same questions and uncertainties as with the 
American securities class action. There probably is in fact a 
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deterrent effect, and beyond that a symbolic value, in 
allowing for securities class actions, but it is difficult to 
quantify and will therefore remain open to criticism on 
purely economic grounds. Thirdly, the story of Morrison and 
the growth of this new alternative is important as a matter 
of political economy. It illustrates that growth in the law is 
neither purely a matter of economic rationality, 
considerations of justice or fairness, or chance, but involves 
an admixture of all three. From a political-economic 
standpoint it is understandable, and ultimately desirable, 
that alternatives for collective litigation are being developed 
in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Securities regulation in the real 
world is not just a matter of economics narrowly conceived, 
but also involves factors that are political and ultimately 
moral. 
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I. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: CLOSING THE 
COURTROOM DOORS 
The legal causes contributing to the growth of the Dutch 
synthetic securities class action include both Dutch and 
American factors. With one exception, the WCAM 
settlements concluded so far are the fruit of a series of 
parallel securities litigations in the United States and the 
Netherlands. Prior to Morrison, non-U.S. shareholders were 
dismissed from the U.S. Federal litigation in both Royal 
Dutch/Shell5 and Converium,6 while the entire U.S. action 
against Fortis was dismissed.7 These three decisions were all 
based on the conduct prong of the pre-Morrison “conduct and 
effects test,” which gave the Federal courts jurisdiction 
where “the defendant’s conduct in the United States was 
more than merely preparatory to the fraud . . . .”8 As these 
cases demonstrate, the conduct test kept foreign plaintiffs 
out of U.S. court where shareholders purchased their shares 
abroad and the intrinsic connection of the alleged fraudulent 
activity to the United States was weak. In overturning the 
conduct and effects test, Morrison goes substantially further. 
Its “transactional test” allows a U.S. Federal court 
jurisdiction over a 10b-5 claim “only in transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities . . . .”9 On the American side, 
then, the original legal cause of the WCAM securities 
settlement was the restrictive application of the conduct test, 
which is now supplanted by Morrison’s far more restrictive 
transactional test.  
 
 5. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 
(D.N.J. 2007). 
 6. In re Scor Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 7. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F.Supp.2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010).  
 8. In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citing Alfadda v. Fenn, 
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 9. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010). 
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Morrison is important on a number of levels. By erecting 
barriers to lawsuits with significant foreign elements, it 
presages the current anti-global moment. Within American 
law, it is an important case in a line of decisions 
strengthening the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
which makes it much more difficult for foreign plaintiffs to 
bring cases in United States federal court.10 It also reflects 
the desire of the Supreme Court’s conservative wing to 
reduce the litigation risk businesses face, which includes 
reducing the sweep of the private right of action under Rule 
10b-5.11 And as a matter of jurisprudence, it is most 
obviously a repudiation of a body of judge-made law 
investing later judges with significant discretion. 
A. The Conduct and Effects Test 
Prior to Morrison, U.S. courts developed two tests to 
determine whether a securities claim with significant foreign 
elements could be brought in U.S. court. Together these are 
labelled the “conduct and effects test.”12 Under the law 
developed by the Second Circuit, and then adopted by the 
other circuits, if significant conduct concerning a foreign 
securities fraud occurred in the U.S., or a foreign securities 
fraud resulted in specific harmful effects on U.S. securities 
markets, the U.S. Federal courts had subject matter 
jurisdiction in such a case. The development of this law was 
prompted by the lack of clear indication in the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act or the 1934 Act) 
itself as to its extraterritorial application. This lack of clear 
 
 10. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) 
(RICO); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (Alien Tort 
statute); Microsoft v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (intellectual property); F. 
Hoffman -La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (antitrust); EEOC 
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (anti-discrimination law). See 
generally Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 
1097–99 (2015). 
 11. See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
 12. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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direction opened the door for Judge Henry Friendly and 
others on the Second Circuit to develop a body of judge-made 
law. While strong policy reasons supported the conduct and 
effects test, and the statutory interpretation supporting it 
was plausible, it was still open to criticism on both legal and 
policy grounds. Judge Bork, and later Justice Scalia, both 
characterized it as an act of judicial legislation.13 Scholars 
also criticized it as indeterminate, as well as potentially 
leading to comity problems with foreign nations and their 
securities regulators.14 
The effects prong of the conduct and effects test begins 
with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.15 Schoenbaum had invested 
in Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian company with stock trading on 
both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the American Stock 
Exchange. Schoenbaum alleged that sales of treasury stock 
to its controlling shareholder and a French bank 
fraudulently deprived the company of value, because the 
directors knew of valuable oil discoveries prior to the sales 
which weren’t factored into the price.16 When the District 
Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,17 Schoenbaum appealed 
and the Second Circuit reversed. Chief Judge Lumbard’s 
opinion is grounded in a rather subtle reading of the 
Exchange Act. The District Court below focused on Exchange 
 
 13. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261; Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 
27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 14. See, e.g., Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities 
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-
Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & 
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities 
Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, 
Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 
WISC. L. REV. 465 (2009); Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting 
the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1992). 
 15. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 16. Id. at 205. 
 17. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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Act Section 30(b), which specifies that in the absence of SEC 
regulations, the Act does not apply “to any person in so far 
as he transacts a business in securities without the 
jurisdiction of the United States[.]”18 The Second Circuit 
however construes Section 30(b) in light of Section 30(a), 
which gives the SEC authority to regulate the overseas 
activities of broker-dealers engaging in transactions on 
foreign exchanges. The court thus cabins the import of 30(b) 
by interpreting it as permitting broker-dealers “to conduct 
transactions in securities outside of the United States 
without complying with the burdensome reporting 
requirement of the Act and without being subject to its 
regulatory provisions . . . .”19 On the court’s understanding, 
then, Section 30(b) does not imply that there is no 
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act, but rather 
that in the absence of SEC rules that would otherwise govern 
such activity, broker-dealers are free to transact on foreign 
stock exchanges.20 Further support for the Act’s 
extraterritorial application is found in SEC interpretations 
applying it abroad.21 The Second Circuit thus determines 
that foreign transactions resulting in detrimental effects on 
the domestic securities markets are subject to the Exchange 
Act.  
The conduct prong begins four years later with Judge 
Friendly’s decision in Leaseco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp. v. Maxwell.22 Here, Leaseco alleged that defendant 
Maxwell and others fraudulently induced it to purchase $22 
million of stock in Pergamon Press in conjunction with a 
planned acquisition.23 There were numerous false 
 
 18. Id. at 392.   
 19. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 206–07. 
 22. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
 23. Id. at 1332–33. 
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communications concerning Pergamon’s financial condition 
and profitability, as well as a rumored outside takeover bid, 
all made in an attempt to sell Pergamon at an inflated 
price.24 Pergamon was a British company and Leaseco had 
purchased the stock on the London Stock Exchange; some of 
these misstatements allegedly occurred in the U.S., while 
others were made in the U.K. 
Judge Friendly begins his analysis by observing that we 
are here concerned with the question of the extent to which 
a state can regulate conduct within its own borders, not 
whether it has prescriptive jurisdiction concerning the 
effects of conduct that occurs abroad.25 Looking at both 
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of 
the 1934 Act, he observes that neither are limited in their 
applicability to the main subject of their respective acts: the 
“registration of securities offered for sale by issuers or 
underwriters unless the securities or transactions were 
exempted”26 in the case of the 1933 Act, and sales of 
securities on the organized stock markets for the 1934 Act.27 
The next step is to conclude that just as Congress intended 
to protect sales of securities not listed “on organized United 
States markets, we cannot perceive any reason why it should 
have wished to limit the protection to securities of American 
issuers.”28 Extending this analysis further, the court asks, as 
Justice Stevens later would in Morrison, whether Congress 
would have intended the anti-fraud provisions of the 
securities law to cover a foreign promoter coming to New 
York and making fraudulent claims intending to induce an 
American to purchase securities in a foreign company.29 
 
 24. Id. at 1331–32. 
 25. Id. at 1333–34.  
 26. Id. at 1335. 
 27. Id. at 1336. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 285 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1336–37. 
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Acknowledging that this is close case, the court determines 
that the 1934 Act should cover such activity, at least “when 
substantial misrepresentations were made in the United 
States.”30 
Judge Friendly’s decision in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone 
Inc.31 is also important for the conduct and effects test. 
Bersch purchased shares of I.O.S., Ltd., a Canadian mutual 
fund manager, in an offering in the Bahamas.32 The court 
was confronted with the question of the degree of conduct or 
effects in the U.S. required for extraterritorial application of 
the Exchange Act. As for conduct, although “Congress did not 
mean the United States to be used as a base for fraudulent 
securities schemes even when the victims are foreigners,” 
that principle does not extend “to cases where the United 
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of 
culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison 
to those abroad.”33 As for the level of effects required, there 
is subject matter jurisdiction only when fraudulent acts 
committed abroad “result in injury to purchasers or sellers of 
. . . securities in whom the United States has an interest, not 
where acts simply have an adverse effect on the American 
economy or on American investors generally.”34 
Bersch is therefore doubly significant. In instructing the 
courts to disregard small or de minimis actions, or very 
general effects, it invests courts with an important, fact-
intensive role. And in arriving at this position, the Bersch 
court itself is engaged in a similar act of judging, but on the 
level of statutory interpretation, as were the Schoenbaum 
and Leasco courts. The decision balances an assumed general 
desire on the part of Congress to protect Americans from 
securities fraud, even when a case has significant foreign 
 
 30. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337. 
 31. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 32. Id. at 980. 
 33. Id. at 987. 
 34. Id. at 989. 
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circumstances, with an awareness that judicial economy 
should preclude considering cases with minimal activity 
conducted in the U.S. or only general, diffuse effects on 
American markets. It is a sophisticated balancing act that 
places the judiciary in a central role, both in its legal function 
as construing the meaning of Federal statutes and in the 
fact-finding role of a District court judge. 
The conduct and effects test begun by Schoenbaum, 
Leaseco, and Bersch was adopted by the other Circuits in 
varying forms, some more stringent and others more 
permissive.35 While it was criticized as indeterminate and 
potentially injurious to international comity, Congress never 
stepped in to rewrite the law in this area, thereby seemingly 
signaling its agreement.36 The test of the Exchange Act’s 
extraterritorial application stood as a body of judge-made 
law until the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank. 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
In overturning the conduct and effects test, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank shuts the door to securities claims 
arising out of foreign transactions. Its transactional test 
replaces the conduct and effects tests with a bright-line rule 
that allows 10(b) claims concerning “only transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities . . . .”37 Morrison is of a piece 
with other recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the 
ability of foreign plaintiffs to access U.S. courts, with Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the majority driven by his signature 
textualist mode of interpretation and its concomitant 
 
 35. See Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation after Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to 
Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 249, 256–57. 
 36. As Justice Stevens emphasizes in his Morrison concurrence. See Morrison, 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278 (2010). 
 37. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.  
2020] GLOBAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 493 
emphasis on legislative supremacy. While the opinion is open 
to serious criticism, its transactional test also responds to 
real defects in the previous body of caselaw under the 
conduct and effects test. By shutting the doors to the U.S. 
Federal courts for foreign securities lawsuits, Morrison 
greatly increases the importance of the development of 
procedural mechanisms applicable to mass claims in 
securities suits outside the United States.   
The Morrison plaintiffs purchased shares in National 
Bank of Australia (“NAB”), an Australian company, on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.38 (While NAB also had 
American Depositary Shares, or ADRs, trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange, these were not at issue in the 
lawsuit.39) In 1998 NAB purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc., 
a Florida company engaged in the American mortgage 
servicing business.40 As a mortgage servicer, its value was 
dependent upon the mortgage servicing rights it possessed. 
When these were written down by $450 million in July 2001, 
and a further $1.75 billion in September 2001, investors 
brought a securities fraud suit against its parent, NAB. They 
alleged that HomeSide had manipulated the financial 
models used to value the mortgage-servicing rights, and that 
even after senior executives at both NAB and HomeSide 
became aware of misstatements based on these models, they 
failed to correct them.41 
Because some of the conduct that occurred during the 
 
 38. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
561 U.S. 247 (2010). Robert Morrison, who was dismissed as a plaintiff in the 
case before it reached the Supreme Court, was an American who purchased ADRs 
in National Australia Bank on the New York Stock Exchange, while the 
remaining three plaintiffs were Australians who had purchased their shares 
abroad. National Australia Bank’s Ordinary Shares traded on the Australian 
Stock Exchange as well as the Tokyo and London Stock Exchanges. Id. at 168.  
 39. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the 
Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 537, 564–66 (2011). 
 40. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251. 
 41. Id. at 252. 
494 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
alleged fraud took place in the United States, plaintiffs 
hoped to bring their case under the “conduct” prong of the 
conduct and effects test. Morrison was a so-called “F-cubed” 
(or “foreign cubed”) case, involving a foreign plaintiff 
purchasing shares in a foreign company on a foreign stock 
exchange.42 As such, it was the type of case with the least 
obvious connection to the United States.43 The Southern 
District of New York found that the activities in the United 
States were “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall 
securities fraud” and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss 
on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.44 The 
Second Circuit affirmed,45 and plaintiffs appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion begins by recasting 
what had long been understood as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction into a merits question: “But to ask what 
conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) 
prohibits, which is a merits question.”46 The practical import 
of this is to convert the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction into a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.47 
The recasting is important on a jurisprudential level as well, 
however. The transformation of a jurisdictional question into 
a merits one deprives a lower court of the ability to determine 
sua sponte as a matter of “adjudicative jurisdiction” whether 
 
 42. See Beyea, supra note 39, at n. 3 (crediting Stuart M. Grant and Diane 
Zilka for coining the term “Foreign Cubed” lawsuit to refer to suits brought by 
foreign plaintiffs concerning the stock of foreign companies traded on foreign 
exchanges in their article The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities 
Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
NUMBER B-1442 93, 96 (Practicing L. Inst. ed., 2004)). 
 43. See Beyea, supra note 39, at 539. 
 44. In re Nat’l Aust. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162, at *25 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 45. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 
U.S. 247 (2010). 
 46. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254. 
 47. Id. 
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it has authority to hear a case.48 Re-casting the (formerly) 
jurisdictional question as a merits question converts it into a 
matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, where the legislature 
holds sway.49 Now Congress, not the judiciary, possesses the 
proper authority to determine whether or not a given case 
falls under the securities law. Recasting the jurisdictional 
question as a merits question supports the opinion’s politics 
of legislative supremacy.50 
After correcting this “threshold error,” Morrison then 
turns to the question of the extraterritorial application of the 
Exchange Act. In the cases formulating the conduct and 
effects test, “the Second Circuit had excised the presumption 
against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of § 10(b) 
and replaced it with the inquiry whether it would be 
reasonable (and hence what Congress would have wanted) to 
apply the statute in a given situation.”51 Quoting Judge Bork, 
the majority observes “that rather than courts’ ‘divining 
what Congress would have wished’ if it had addressed the 
problem[, a] more natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction 
Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”52 The Court 
then reviews three provisions of the Exchange Act. The 
definition of “interstate commerce” includes “trade, 
commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between 
any foreign country and any State.”53 EEOC v. Aramco 
however pointed out that the Court had “repeatedly held that 
 
 48. See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2014). 
 49. See Maria Slobodchikova, Private Right of Action in Transactions with 
Cross-Border Security-Based Swaps, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 739, 753–56 
(2016). 
 50. See Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 666–67 (2011).  
 51. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.  
 52. Id. at 260 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2012). 
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even statutes that contain broad language in their 
definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly refer to ‘foreign 
commerce’ do not apply abroad.”54 Next, Section 2(2) of the 
Exchange Act states that “prices established and offered in 
such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted” 
abroad.55 The antecedent of “such transactions” was 
transactions on U.S. exchanges, however, and the Court 
determines that this is not enough to support a foreign 
application. Finally, the Court analyzes Section 30 of 
Exchange Act, interpreting it as the District court in 
Schoenbaum had.56 Section 30(b) states that “[t]he provisions 
of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder 
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a 
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United 
States” unless he does so in violation of regulations 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission “to 
prevent the evasion of [the Act].”57 In the interpretation of 
the Solicitor General, and Judge Lumbard writing for the 
Second Circuit in Schoenbaum, this passage presumes that 
the Act does apply abroad in the first instance.58 The 
Morrison majority rejects this view, stating that it would be 
odd to indicate the extraterritorial application of the entire 
statute in such a roundabout manner.59 Furthermore, § 30(a) 
does specify that the provisions of the Act shall apply 
extraterritorially when a broker or dealer uses a foreign 
exchange to effect a transaction that would be impermissible 
on a U.S. exchange.60 The majority opinion agrees with the 
District Court in Schoenbaum, holding that the Exchange 
 
 54. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262-63 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 251 (1991)). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2012). 
 56. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 57. 15 U.S. § 78dd(b) (2012). 
 58. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 263–64; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 
207–08 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 59. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264. 
 60. Id. at 264–65. 
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Act does not apply extraterritorially.61 
Even though the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies, the facts of Morrison concern the conduct prong of 
the conduct and effects test. Because some of the allegedly 
fraudulent activity took place within the United States, the 
Court engages in a further inquiry, asking after the “focus” 
of the statute and whether it should apply in this case.62 The 
Court finds that the “focus” of the 1934 Act is “not upon the 
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases 
and sales of securities in the United States.”63 With this 
determination, the court finds that the Exchange Act does 
not apply here. It then announces the new transactional test 
to replace the conduct and effects test: “And it is in our view 
only such transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to 
which § 10(b) applies.”64  
C. The Political Economy of Morrison 
Morrison is a landmark case in American securities law, 
and has received significant attention from both academics 
and practictioners in the decade since it was handed down. 
For purposes of this Article, there are four principal points 
to note: first, from the American side, the restrictive 
application of the conduct and effects test and then Morrison 
are primary legal causes of the development of non-U.S. 
securities class actions. They are however negative causes in 
the sense that they do not themselves enable this 
development, but merely spur it on. Second, the Morrison 
 
 61. Id. at 265. 
 62. Commentators have focused criticism of the Morrison opinion on this step; 
see, e.g., Brilmayer, supra n.50, at 661–66; Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified 
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1045 (2011); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, An Introduction to the Symposium and an Examination of Morrison’s 
Impact on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 173, 176–77 (2014).  
 63. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
 64. Id. at 267. 
498 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
opinion itself appears to be primarily driven by Justice 
Scalia’s jurisprudential commitments, not economic ones, 
including even matters of “judicial economy.” Third, the 
transactional test can simultaneously be understood as 
implementing a theory of regulatory competition advocated 
by law and economics scholars as part of their criticism of the 
U.S. securities class action. Fourth, the concept of 
territoriality embodied in Morrison is a throwback to 19th 
century jurisdictional conceptions. 
First, the complete closing of the courtroom doors by 
Morrison is the key legal factor driving the development of 
alternatives to the U.S. securities fraud class action in the 
past decade. While a number of countries did include some 
form of class action mechanism in their laws prior to 
Morrison, its effect has been to prompt entrepreneurial 
lawyers to test these other jurisdictions. This has brought 
about what Professor Coffee terms the “synthetic class 
action,” which uses the Dutch WCAM settlement mechanism 
in combination with third-party funding structures to arrive 
at what functionally amounts to a class action covering non-
U.S. investors in multi-national corporations.65 While the 
Netherlands is the most important site for non-U.S. class 
actions, and is the focus of Part II of this Article, noteworthy 
cases have also occurred in Japan, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, and the U.K.66 Had Morrison not closed the doors 
to the U.S. courts for foreign investors, this period of legal 
experimentation and rapid development would likely not 
 
 65. See Zachary D. Clopton, The Global Class Action and Its Alternatives, 19 
THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 125 (2018); Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining 
Sea: How and Why Class Actions are Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965 
(2017); see also Bookman, supra note 10, at 1115–16; John C. Coffee, The 
Globalization of Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/09/19/the-globalization-of-securities-
litigation. 
 66. See David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen & Angela M. Liu, Global 
Securities Litigation Trends, DECHERT LLP (July 2019), https://www.dechert.com/ 
knowledge/onpoint/2017/11/developments-in-global-securities-litigation.html. 
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have occurred.67 Morrison is therefore the key negative cause 
of the growth in global securities class actions. It doesn’t 
itself enable or allow these claims, but by forcing plaintiffs 
and their counsel to explore jurisdictions other than the U.S. 
it spurred their development. 
Second, the majority opinion in Morrison is obviously 
motivated by Justice Scalia’s larger jurisprudential 
commitments. These are most famously to a textual mode of 
statutory interpretation as well as to the principle of 
legislative supremacy. While the Morrison majority’s 
exercise of statutory interpretation is open to criticism, 
courts have struggled since the 1960s with the question of 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law.68 The 
Second Circuit’s reading of the 1934 Act is subtle and non-
obvious, relying on a roundabout interpretation of Section 30 
to argue that Congress implicitly intended the Act to apply 
abroad. By focusing on the statute and failing to find any 
clear indication that Congress intended the 1934 Act to apply 
abroad,69 Justice Scalia is using his familiar method of 
focusing on the text of a law itself to divine its meaning. This 
 
 67. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1900.  
 68. The Schoenbaum Court discusses both Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) and Ferraioli v. Cantor, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91, 615 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), which the District Court below relied on. See Schoenbaum, 405 
F.2d at 208. Both these cases rejected the extraterritorial application of the 1934 
Act; the Second Circuit believed that Kook properly interpreted Sec. 30(b) to 
disallow application of Sec. 7(c) of the 1934 Act, while Ferraioli extended this too 
far in holding that an isolated transaction in Canada was not subject to the Act. 
See also Zoelsch, v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31–33 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality but ultimately deferring 
to the Second Circuit). For development of the argument that the 1934 Act should 
not apply extraterritorially, see Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of 
Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677 
(1990). 
 69. Whether or not the majority is hereby instituting a “clear statement rule” 
is in dispute in Morrison. Compare the majority’s declaration that “Subsection 
30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect,” 
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265, with Justice Stevens’s claim that “the Court seeks to 
transform the presumption from a flexible rule of thumb into something more 
like a clear statement rule.” Id. at 278. 
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is in direct contrast to Judge Friendly’s “purposive” mode of 
interpretation in Leaseco and Bersch.70 The decision also 
furthers Justice Scalia’s commitment to legislative 
supremacy by depriving lower Federal court judges of the 
discretion to determine whether a foreign securities case 
meets the threshold for subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. 
court. 
Behind these jurisprudential commitments also sits a 
political commitment of the modern conservative legal 
movement, of which Justice Scalia was the most important 
figure. This is the goal of raising the barriers to lawsuits 
against corporate defendants that are perceived as meritless 
or frivolous.71 As Justice Stevens notes in his Morrison 
concurrence—in the judgment only, and really a dissent—
the majority opinion is part of a sweep of securities law 
decisions trimming back the private right of action under 
Rule 10b-5.72 Such decisions include Central Bank of 
Denver73 and Stoneridge74 as well as more recent cases 
 
 70. See Boehm, supra note 35, at 254–55. Of course, it is Judge Friendly’s 
creation of the conduct and effects test after considering what “Congress would 
have wanted” that is the target of Justice Scalia’s criticism. Morrison, 561 U.S. 
at 255–61. 
 71. See Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: 
Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 
40 (2015); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 465, 477 (2012); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: 
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006); Bookman, supra note 10, at 1085, 
1107. A crucial victory for this movement was the passage of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534–36 (2006).  
 72. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286 (quoting his dissent in Stoneridge Inv. Partners 
v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008)); cf. John C. Coates IV, Securities 
Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) 
(noting that securities law cases in the Roberts court have been “significantly 
more ‘expansive’” than in the Powell era). 
 73. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164 (1994). 
 74. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
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including Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.75 and 
Janus Capital Group76 (though not Halliburton II,77 which 
preserves the reliance presumption). Furthermore, such 
decisions are of a piece with decisions by the Roberts court in 
the areas of civil procedure and class action claims, which 
continue the trend begun under the Rehnquist court to 
restrict the ability of plaintiffs to bring claims in federal 
court against business defendants.78 Morrison therefore may 
not only be motivated by matters of jurisprudence, but also 
by what can be termed matters of political economy—the 
commitment of the conservative judicial movement to 
restrict the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring cases in 
federal court against corporate defendants. 
Even though the jurisprudential commitments of the 
conservative wing of the Court most obviously drive 
Morrison, its transactional test is commensurate with the 
criticism of class action lawsuits pursued by law and 
economics scholars since the 1980s.79 Professors Choi and 
Guzman, and Romano, among others, have all advocated for 
a system of regulatory competition in the area of securities 
law.80 Just as the states could be seen as offering competing 
legal regimes for corporate law, these scholars advocated for 
 
 75. 551 U.S. 308, 328–29 (2007). 
 76. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 146–
48 (2011). 
 77. Erica John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton II), 563 U.S. 804, 
811–13 (2011). 
 78. See Coates, supra note 72, at 3.   
 79. See Beyea, supra note 39, at 550–51, 558–60 (citing Stephen J. Choi & 
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities 
Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 219–39 (1996) and Choi & Silberman, supra 
note 14, at 480–88). 
 80. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking 
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); see 
generally Stephen Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 815 (2001); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, 
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRY L. 387 (2001). 
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a similar system in securities law. This could occur through 
a legal regime that allowed issuers to choose the level of 
securities regulation that would apply to them, or through 
transnational competition in securities regulation. By 
limiting the protections of the 1934 Act to investors 
purchasing securities in United States-based transactions, 
the transactional test can be seen as instantiating this 
theory.81 Because only these transactions would be covered, 
issuers would now have the choice in deciding where to list 
their securities. If they believed investors would be better off 
without the protections of U.S. securities law, and the 
attendant costs of defending against securities class action 
lawsuits, they would have the choice not to sell their 
securities in U.S.-based transactions.82 The transactional 
test therefore is a step in the direction of allowing issuer and 
investor choice in securities law, and so can be seen as 
implementing the theory of regulatory competition in 
securities law put forward by law and economics scholars.83  
Finally, it is important to note that the conception of 
territoriality embodied in the transactional test is a 
throwback to a nineteenth century conception.84 Whether 
conceived of as a question on the merits or of subject matter 
jurisdiction, a test that rests on a firm distinction between 
what is inside U.S. borders and everything else sits in 
tension, sometimes severe, with modern financial practice.85 
 
 81. See Beyea, supra note 39, at n.86; Choi & Silberman, supra note 14. 
 82. There is evidence to suggest that in fact investors do not value the private 
right of action against international corporations. See John Armour, et al., 
Investor Choice in Global Securities Markets 42 (EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., 
WORKING PAPER NO. 371, 2017); Amir N. Licht, et al., What Makes Bonding Stick? 
A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms 
31 (EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., WORKING PAPER NO. 524, 2017).   
 83. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice 
of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 132, 142 (2012). 
 84. Bookman, supra note 10, at 1098; see Colangelo, supra note 62, at 1080. 
 85. See Edward Greene & Arpan Patel, Consequences of Morrison v. NAB, 
Securities Litigation and Beyond, 11 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 145, 159–60 (2016); see also 
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While the recent cases reviving the presumption against 
extraterritoriality depend on a clear border between what is 
inside and outside the U.S., in drawing this line in twenty-
first century financial law Morrison represents 
“extraterritoriality on steroids.”86 While beyond the scope of 
this Article, many of the difficulties of applying Morrison to 
the world of contemporary finance stem from fact patterns 
where it is not clear what—if any—jurisdiction a transaction 
occurs in.87 Part of the significance of Morrison then is that 
it attempts to erect firm borders in a globalizing world.88 
Indeed, Morrison, and the strengthening of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality more generally, can be seen as a 
precursor to the current anti-global moment we are now 
witnessing in many polities across the world. 
  
 
Armour et al., supra note 82, at 9–11 (discussing how technological development 
causes geographic proximity to decrease in importance). 
 86. Colangelo, A Unified Approach, supra note 62, at 1057. 
 87. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors under U.S. 
Federal Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 167 (2012); Christopher 
Calfee, Can’t See the Forest for the Trees: Where Does a Purchase or Sale of 
Securities Occur?, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (2012). 
 88. See Amir Licht, Liability for Transnational Securities Fraud, Quo Vadis? 
31 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 272, 2014). 
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II. THE DUTCH MASS SETTLEMENT MECHANISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE GLOBAL SECURITIES SETTLEMENT 
While Morrison incentivizes shareholders and their 
representatives to look for alternatives to the American 
securities fraud class action, the implementation of legal 
mechanisms allowing for mass claims in non-U.S. 
jurisdictions is the positive factor leading to the development 
of the global securities class action. While a number of 
jurisdictions potentially allow for these claims, so far the 
most important one has been the Netherlands. Not only is 
the Dutch WCAM flexible and easy to use when companies 
and shareholder representatives agree on a settlement, the 
liberal interpretation of its jurisdictional requirements by 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals has allowed for truly global 
settlements. Part II below first surveys the main features of 
the WCAM, and then takes an in-depth look at its application 
in securities fraud cases so far.  
A. The WCAM Mechanism 
The Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massachade was 
originally enacted to provide the manufacturer of the 
synthetic hormone DES a means to settle the many claims 
that arose after children were born with birth defects to 
mothers using the drug.89 DES presented a classic mass tort 
situation, where thousands of children were born with birth 
defects caused by the drug. While originally added to the 
Dutch Civil Code (and the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure) to 
allow for settlement of this type of claim in a manner which 
would provide compensation to the victims and finality to the 
wrongdoer, the WCAM was not restricted to mass tort cases 
and was soon applied to other types of claims. 
 
 89. See Bart Krans, The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, 
27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 281, 284 (2014). The DES case was 
settled in 2006. See Hof’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m.nt. 
(Foundation Centre DES et al.) (Neth.). The WCAM comprises Articles 7:907–
910 of the Dutch Civil Code [hereinafter, DCC] and Article 1013 of the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter, DCCP] (translated by author). 
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Because it only allows for a settlement, and not a 
collective action determining liability, it is fundamentally 
different from the class action lawsuit that American 
lawyers are familiar with under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.90 Although a proposal to allow for legal 
actions that would determine damages in mass claims was 
introduced in the Dutch Parliament in 2016,91 the WCAM 
itself does not give would-be plaintiffs that right. Its scope is 
more modest: It allows the parties to a settlement agreement 
to petition the Court of Appeals in Amsterdam, bypassing the 
Court of First Instance, to declare the agreement binding 
between the parties.92 While this procedure is far more 
limited than what American lawyers think of as a class 
action lawsuit, its limited nature has actually allowed it to 
function effectively as the vehicle to resolve mass claims on 
a global scale in certain cases. A look at its essential legal 
features illustrates why this is so. 
First, because all parties to a Settlement Agreement are 
required to petition the court to declare the settlement 
binding, it requires that the parties themselves agree to 
conclude the dispute before the courts become involved.93 
Under the WCAM, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals only 
gives a mutually agreed upon settlement effect. If the parties 
can agree, the settlement is presumably mutually beneficial 
to all parties given the factual and legal context of the 
dispute. The parties to the settlement will be an association 
(Stichting) or foundation (the Dutch Association for 
Shareholders, Vereniging voor Effectenbezitters or “VEB” is a 
 
 90. See Hensler, supra note 65, at 971 (“Variations in Class Action Design”). 
 91. See Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk & Bart van Heeswijk, Netherlands, 
CLASS ACTIONS L. REV. 133–36 (2019). 
 92. DCCP 1013(3). Standing in a WCAM action is limited to a foundation or 
association. See Ianika Tzankova, Everything You Wanted to Know about Dutch 
Foundations but Never Dared to Ask: A Checklist for Investors (Tilburg L. Sch. 
Legal Stud. Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 04, 2016), http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730618. 
 93. See Krans, supra note 89, at 287. 
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foundation involved in the settlements discussed below) set 
up to represent the interests of those who have suffered 
harm, and the parties that have (allegedly) caused the 
harm.94 The association or foundation can bring a legal 
action for a declaratory judgment to determine the liability 
of defendants on an opt-in basis, but such a proceeding is not 
required to bring a settlement before the Amsterdam court.95 
(Nor would the result of such an action have res judicata 
effect in another action.96) By making the involvement of the 
court dependent on the mutual agreement of the parties, any 
settlement reached is presumably mutually beneficial, given 
the alternatives.97 If any party does not agree to a proposed 
settlement, it cannot be declared binding by the court. 
A number of factors incentivize the shareholder 
representatives to accept an agreement. Perhaps most 
important is that after a settlement is declared binding, if 
parties who would be beneficiaries under the settlement do 
not opt out within a specified time period they will be barred 
from bringing a separate claim.98 Because the WCAM is an  
“opt-out” mechanism, not an opt-in one as is typical 
elsewhere outside the U.S.,99 it automatically operates to 
include individual beneficiaries of the settlement after it has 
been given binding effect by the Court.100 On the side of the 
party allegedly causing the harm, there can also be strong 
 
 94. DCC 7:907(1). 
 95. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1903–04. Such an action would be brought 
under DCC 3:305. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 135–36.  
 96. See Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: 
Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from the Netherlands, EUR. BUS. L. 
REV. 857, 864 (2010). 
 97. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906.  
 98. See Willem H. Van Boom, Collective Settlements of Mass Claims in the 
Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE 171, 185 
(Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009). 
 99. Hensler, supra note 65, at 974 (stating that Australia, Canada, and Israel 
follow the U.S. in having opt-out procedures). 
 100. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 132. 
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incentives to settle. Most important is finality. Because of its 
opt-out nature, defendants who settle under the WCAM are 
given peace of mind that the large majority of potential 
claims will be settled.101 Once a settlement is declared 
binding, potential plaintiffs who have not opted out after the 
end of the opt-out period set by the court, usually three to six 
months, are barred from bringing claims.102 Furthermore, 
the fact that a settlement is made independently of any 
substantive legal action means that defendants willing to 
settle are not subject to the risks of American-style 
discovery.103 While Dutch law contains only limited discovery 
obligations, a settlement sidesteps the risks of discovery 
altogether.104 For both plaintiffs and defendants, then, a 
settlement under the WCAM can be attractive.  
The fee structures in WCAM settlements also incentivize 
working towards a settlement. While Dutch rules concerning 
legal practice forbid contingency fees, they do not prevent 
third party litigation funding.105 American law firms 
specializing in class actions have therefore been able to 
create funding structures that effectively surmount the 
prohibition on contingency fee lawyering in the 
Netherlands.106 An American law firm can act as a match-
maker between the Dutch stichtings or foundations 
representing the interested parties, a law firm in the 
 
 101. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906.  
 102. See Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, at 136–37. 
 103. An exception to this general principle would be when parties representing 
Dutch entities have access to discovery materials available in a parallel litigation 
in the U.S. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Class-Action ‘Mash-Up’: In Re Royal 
Dutch/Shell Transport Securities Litigation, CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT 178 
(Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016). 
 104. See Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk & Dennis Horeman, The Netherlands, in 
4 SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW 207 (William Savitt ed., 2018) (detailing limited 
discovery available in Dutch civil procedure). 
 105. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1904–05; see Tjeenk & Heeswijk, supra note 91, 
at 136. 
 106. For an in-depth look at how this developed, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015). 
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Netherlands bringing the settlement to the Amsterdam 
Court, and third-party litigation funders such as hedge 
funds. The Dutch law firm is paid its standard hourly rate, 
regardless of success. The Dutch courts however allow for the 
other parties (i.e., the American law firm and the third-party 
funders) to be paid out of the amount of the settlement 
award. In Converium the courts specifically allowed fees of 
20% of the total award, and justified this decision on the 
basis of the typical American practice.107 Financially then, 
the WCAM really is a “synthetic” class action insofar as it 
allows the replication of the American financial incentives 
for plaintiffs’ representatives in bringing a claim in the first 
place. 
The web of Dutch and European Union jurisdictional 
rules at stake and the Amsterdam Court’s flexible approach 
to their implementation are also critical.108 While the 
Netherlands does have a number of important global 
enterprises, and some of the key parties to the settlements 
so far have been businesses domiciled (or with very 
substantial business) in the Netherlands, it is a small 
country. The primary jurisdictional challenge then is for the 
Court to legitimately claim jurisdiction over parties to the 
agreement that are not located there. While some of the mass 
tort actions the WCAM was intended to apply to have all, or 
mostly, Dutch “interested parties,” in the securities fraud 
settlements this is generally not the case. In Converium, for 
example, only 3% of the shareholders who would benefit from 
the settlement were domiciled in the Netherlands.109 
Before outlining the jurisdictional bases used in the 
WCAM settlements, a terminological point is important. In 
 
 107. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 108. See generally HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH SETTLEMENT ACT AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33, 48 (2010); Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective 
Action and Private International Law Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global 
Aspirations and Regional Boundaries, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. 
L.J. 235, 237–38 (2014). 
 109. See infra notes 166–74 and accompanying text. 
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the Court’s decisions approving the settlements discussed 
below, the parties bringing the settlement action before the 
court are termed “petitioners,” while the parties who would 
be bound by it are termed “defendants” or “interested 
parties” (belanghebbenden).110 To American ears at least, 
this is confusing, because “defendants” here denotes the 
shareholders who would be the plaintiffs in an American 
class action. The reason for this awkward use of terminology 
stems from a mismatch between the WCAM statute and the 
Brussels Regulation governing cross-border litigation.111 
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation governing international 
legal claims allows for “general jurisdiction at the court of 
the place of the domicile of the ‘person to be sued.’”112 Despite 
the awkward fit, Article 2 of Brussels I provides Dutch courts 
with jurisdiction over the settlement action where at least 
one of the “defendants” is located in the Netherlands. 
There are three principal routes by which the 
Amsterdam court can assume jurisdiction. For Dutch 
parties, jurisdiction comes under Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
I Regulation on Enforcement of Judgments. As stated above, 
jurisdiction over a person “to be sued” is proper in the courts 
where she is domiciled.113 For non-Dutch parties domiciled 
in the European Union or a country that is a member of the 
Lugano Convention (Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway), 
jurisdiction is proper under Art. 6(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. Where 
he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where 
 
 110. See van Lith, supra note 108, at 39; Kramer, supra note 108, at 250–51, 
259 (explaining the reason for this and then observing that “[i]t is submitted that 
this approach is highly questionable.”). 
 111. See Kramer, supra note 108, at 251; see also Arons & van Boom, supra 
note 96, at 876–77; Thijs Bosters, Goals of the Brussels Regulation Regarding 
Jurisdiction, in COLLECTIVE REDRESS AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
E.U. 165 (2017). 
 112. Art. 2 para. 1 EC. 
 113. Id. 
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any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together 
to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings . . . .114 
Finally, for non-Dutch, non-E.U., and non-Lugano 
Convention persons, jurisdiction comes under Art. 3 of the 
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, “Legal Proceedings initiated 
by a petition.” Article 3(a) provides for jurisdiction if either 
the petitioner, or one of them if there are more than one, is 
domiciled in the Netherlands.115 And Article 3(c) is a catch-
all provision that provides jurisdiction where “the legal 
proceedings are otherwise sufficiently connected with the 
Dutch legal sphere.”116  
A final key aspect of the WCAM is its inherent flexibility 
as to the legal liability, if any, underlying a claim.117 While 
Dutch procedural law will apply to the settlement agreement 
itself, and E.U. and international law to the enforceability of 
a settlement, the substantive legal liability at stake in a 
claim can come from any jurisdiction. Because the parties to 
the settlement craft the agreement itself, and merely bring 
it before the Amsterdam Court, the underlying basis for the 
claim can be based on any jurisdiction’s law, or the law of 
multiple jurisdictions. While this can result in difficulties 
concerning differing amounts of compensation provided to 
different classes of plaintiffs in the Schedule appended to the 
settlement,118 it allows the WCAM maximum flexibility to 
implement a settlement without forcing the Court into 
conflict of laws issues. Combined with the incentives the 
 
 114. Id. at 6(1). 
 115. DCCP Art. 3(a). 
 116. DCCP Art. 3(c); see van Lith, supra note 108, at 47–48. 
 117. The fact that the part of the WCAM statute in the Dutch Civil Code is 
located in Book 7 dealing with contracts signals that it grounded in contract, not 
tort. There is therefore no requirement as to the underlying legal basis for 
liability, but rather simply an agreement of the parties to settle a dispute. See 
Arons & van Boom, supra note 96, at 868. 
 118. See Krans, supra note 89, at 285 (discussing damage scheduling). 
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various parties have to enter into the agreement, this 
flexibility with respect to the underlying liability at stake is 
essential to creating a truly global class action. 
B. Securities Settlements under the WCAM 
The WCAM was added to the Dutch Civil Code and Code 
of Civil Procedure in 2005, and the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals has approved on average two settlements per year 
in the period 2005–2014.119 Four of the settlements concern 
securities fraud allegations and so represent global synthetic 
securities class actions. The progression of these cases shows 
a pattern of increasing jurisdictional sweep, as well as an 
increase in value up to $1.2 billion euros in the 2018 Fortis 
settlement. The ongoing Petrobras litigation presents 
another potentially very important case. Not only might its 
settlement value exceed that of Fortis, but in a preliminary 
action to determine liability brought under Article 3:305 of 
the DCC the Rotterdam Court of First Instance recently 
declined to honor an arbitration clause in the corporate 
charter that Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New 
York upheld in the parallel U.S. securities class action.120 
The securities settlements so far show the Amsterdam 
Appeals Court becoming more comfortable with an expansive 
application of governing jurisdictional law, as well as a 
pattern of increasing settlement values. Two recent failed 
attempts at settlements however demonstrate the need for 
caution on the part of shareholders and their attorneys. 
Despite the willingness of the courts to interpret 
jurisdictional and other requirements of the WCAM statute 
liberally, when the parties can’t agree to a settlement, 
shareholders have little leverage to press a claim. 
 
 
 119. See Focus on Collective Redress: The Netherlands, THE BRIT. INST. OF INT’L 
& COMP. L., https://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/reports/thenethe 
rlands/caselaw. 
 120. See discussion infra Section II.B.4. 
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1. Shell Petroleum 
Shell Petroleum began when the company announced 
restatements of its oil reserves previously put forward in its 
securities filings. During the period 1998–2002, Royal 
Dutch/Shell (“RDS”) managers were extremely aggressive in 
booking oil reserves.121 Similar to some of the more familiar 
accounting scandals from the early 2000s, this amounted to 
an exercise in hoping that future performance would justify 
the very optimistic numbers posted. When SEC guidelines 
clarified how oil and natural gas reserves were to be 
accounted for, the company was forced to lower its estimate 
of its reserves by a total of 4.47 billion barrels, or 23% of 
reserves as earlier stated.122 The effect of the series of 
restatements in early 2004 was a $13.84 billion loss in 
market capitalization.123 
Plaintiffs quickly filed suit in the District Court of New 
Jersey. Due to the Third Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the 
conduct test, plaintiffs’ counsel Stanley Bernstein of 
Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz hoped that the court would 
allow a global class of shareholders.124 Bernstein’s aggressive 
lawyering, however, dissuaded RDS’s General Counsel from 
offering a settlement.125 Instead, the company fought back, 
arguing that the non-U.S. plaintiffs should be dismissed.126 
The court initially rejected Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.127 As the 
case progressed in U.S. court, RDS opened discussions with 
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., the U.S. law firm representing two 
large Dutch pension funds that were considering opting out 
 
 121. See In re: Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 527–
30 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 122. Id. at 517. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 175. 
 125. See id. at 177–78. 
 126. In re Royal Dutch, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 539.  
 127. Id. 
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of the class action.128 These negotiations were a prelude to 
the settlement of the claims of both U.S. and non-U.S. 
investors. In 2007, a special master, appointed by Judge 
Pisano, recommended dismissing the non-U.S. plaintiffs due 
to insufficient conduct on the part of RDS in the U.S. to meet 
the conduct test.129 In conjunction with the negotiation of a 
settlement offer and its acceptance by the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeals, Judge Pisano granted defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the non-U.S. plaintiffs.130 
Shell Petroleum131 is important as both the first 
securities settlement brought under the WCAM and the 
beginning of a line of parallel securities claims in U.S. courts 
and the Netherlands.132 In addition to simply being the first 
settlement given effect under the WCAM, the treatment of 
jurisdictional issues by the Dutch court and the bargaining 
position of the parties are important. The direct parties to 
the settlement includ the two Royal Dutch/Shell entities, a 
stichting or foundation formed to represent shareholders, the 
VEB (Vereniging von Effectenbezitters or Dutch Investors 
Association), and foundations representing two Dutch 
pension funds. For the direct parties to the settlement, Shell 
Petroleum N.V. (a Dutch Company), Shell Transport and 
Trading Company Ltd. (a U.K. corporation), as well as the 
shareholder representatives, jurisdiction is not an issue as 
they are applicants petitioning the court for a binding 
declaration.133 The court does, however, discuss its 
 
 128. See Hensler, A Class Action Mash-Up, supra note 103, at 178. 
 129. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 
(D.N.J. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 723–24. 
 131. Hof’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 m.nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell 
Petroleum NV/Dexia Bank Nederland NV) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell Petroleum] 
(translated by author). 
 132. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 83, at 154–55 (discussing the phenomenon 
of parallel or “piggyback” securities litigations in different national courts). 
 133. See Shell Petroleum ¶ 5.1. Although the decision here does not specifically 
cite Art. 6(1) of the Brussels Regulation, the Court’s reference to a “close 
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jurisdiction over the U.K. RDS entity, Shell Transport and 
Trading Company Ltd., under the Brussels I Regulation. The 
court finds that jurisdiction over the U.K. company is proper 
on account of the required “close connection” between the 
claims concerning Shell Petroleum N.V. and Shell Transport 
and Trading Company Ltd.134  
Finding jurisdiction over the “interested parties” in the 
settlement, who would be the plaintiffs in an American class 
action, presents a more complex but by no means 
insurmountable challenge. As noted above, a mass action 
with many plaintiffs presents an awkward fit with both 
Dutch and European civil procedure.135 The Amsterdam 
court surmounts this problem by conceiving of the interested 
parties, i.e., the shareholders, as defendants.136 The court 
distinguishes three categories of interested parties: those in 
the Netherlands, those outside of the Netherlands but in an 
E.U. member or Lugano Convention country, and everyone 
else. The numbers of these three categories of “interested 
persons” or shareholders with addresses known to the 
applicants were 798 in the Netherlands,137 103,685 in the 
U.K.,138 and 7,105 others.139 That leaves approximately 
400,000 with unknown addresses.140 The Shell Petroleum 
court interprets the applicable jurisdictional rules in an 
expansive manner, thereby allowing it to give effect to a 
settlement covering hundreds of thousands of shareholders 
not in the E.U., other Lugano convention countries, or the 
U.S. 
 
connection” indicates that is the provision giving it jurisdiction over the U.K. 
entity. See also VAN LITH, supra note 108, at 33. 
 134. See Shell Petroleum, ¶ 5.26; see also Kramer, supra note 108, at 254; VAN 
LITH, supra note 108, at 33.  
 135. See notes 110–12 supra and accompanying text. 
 136. See Shell Petroleum, ¶ 5.10(b). 
 137. Id., ¶ 5.10(a). 
 138. Id., ¶ 5.10(b). 
 139. Id., ¶ 5.10(c). 
 140. Id., ¶ 5.13. 
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The WCAM is also fundamentally flexible with respect 
to the legal claim at stake. Commensurate with the fact that 
the application of the settlement parties to the court is 
voluntary, there is no legal requirement as to the nature of 
the claims being settled or that parties admit liability. In 
Shell Petroleum, the original claims on behalf of the 
worldwide plaintiffs, as well as plaintiffs purchasing shares 
in U.S. transactions, were brought under U.S. securities law. 
The non-U.S. plaintiffs were dismissed from the case on 
account of insufficient conduct within the United States to 
meet the standard of the conduct test.141 (Recall that the New 
Jersey Federal Court’s 2007 decision is pre-Morrison.) The 
Amsterdam Court however does not discuss any particular 
theory of legal liability for the claims, and the settlement 
expressly states that the Royal Dutch/Shell entities do not 
admit liability.142 The WCAM settlement mechanism neither 
requires a specific law as the basis for liability nor an 
admission or determination of fault. It is important to note, 
though, that in the settlement negotiations in the 
Netherlands, the shareholder representatives had a crucial 
point of leverage against the company that would be lacking 
in some later cases: approval of the U.S. settlement, and 
dismissal of the claim on the part of non-U.S. shareholders, 
was contingent upon reaching the foreign settlement.143 
The amount of the settlement is also noteworthy. 
Shareholders in the Dutch settlement received 
approximately $359 million in total compensation, plus 
attorneys’ costs of approximately $50 million.144 (In the 
parallel U.S. settlement, shareholders received 
 
 141. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 
(D.N.J. 2007). 
 142. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., The Shell Settlement and the Dutch Act 
on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Apr. 16, 2007). 
 143. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 715; see also Henlser, 
supra note 103, at 180. 
 144. See Hensler, supra note 103, at 181–82. 
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approximately $80 million.145) The total loss in market 
capitalization alleged by plaintiffs, and thus the total value 
of the alleged claims of both U.S. and non-U.S. shareholders, 
was $13.84 billion.146 While the Amsterdam court does not 
explicitly discuss the total value of the claims against the 
RDS entities, it does state that the settlement before it (of 
$352 mil.) will provide between 9.79% and 12.46% of the 
estimated damages, leading to a total non-U.S. claim in the 
vicinity of $3.5 billion.147 Not only does the total amount of 
both settlements put Shell Petroleum firmly in the category 
of a “Mega Settlement,” it is significantly higher than the 
typical median settlement (2–3%) as a percentage of 
estimated damages.148 The fact that the U.S. settlement was 
conditioned upon reaching a Dutch one likely played a 
significant role in reaching such a high percentage.  
2. Vedior 
The Vedior settlement was the second securities 
settlement brought under the WCAM.149 It was a small and 
straightforward case. On November 30, 2007, Dutch multi-
national staffing firm Randstad agreed to acquire its 
competitor Vedior.150 Vedior shares traded at 12.36 euros 
when the market opened at 9 a.m. on November 30.151 As 
rumors began to circulate concerning the deal, Vedior shares 
climbed to 13.63 by 10:45 a.m. By the time the Netherlands 
 
 145. See id. at 185. 
 146. In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 147. Shell Petroleum, ¶ 6.16. 
 148. See SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH (2016). 
 149. Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt. ACW Pijls [ECLI:NL: 
GHAMS:2009:BJ2695BJ2691] (Randstad Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior] 
(translated by author). 
 150. See Reed Stevenson, Dutch Staffing Firm Randstad to Buy Rival Vedior, 
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2007), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vedior-randstad/ 
dutch-staffing-firm-randstad-to-buy-rival-vedior-idUSL0357707620071203.  
 151. See Vedior, at ¶ 2.3. 
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Authority for the Financial Markets halted trading in Vedior 
on the Euronext exchange at 11:34 a.m., the price had 
reached 15.80. When trading resumed at 1:20 p.m., the price 
was 15.80.152 
 The VEB and a stichting set up to pursue these claims 
reached a settlement with Randstad, which had acquired 
Vedior. The agreement provided that Randstad would offer 
compensation to those who sold Vedior shares before the halt 
of trading on the morning of November 30 amounting to 80% 
of the difference between what they sold the shares at and 
the re-opening price of 15.80.153 The total fund available for 
Vedior shareholders who sold in that period came to 4.25 
million euros.154 Vedior represents a straightforward failure 
of disclosure and breaks no new ground as a WCAM 
settlement.   
3. Converium 
Converium represents the next step in the evolution of 
securities settlements under the WCAM. Like Royal 
Dutch/Shell, it was a parallel litigation that began in U.S. 
Federal court.155 Unlike its predecessor, however, the 
connection to the Netherlands was much less obvious, as no 
corporate entity and a mere 3.0% of the shareholders were 
domiciled in the Netherlands. Converium is therefore 
important because of the very broad interpretation of the 
governing jurisdictional statutes the court offers in its 
preliminary opinion in the case, which provide it with near-
universal jurisdiction.156 The court’s second decision, 
approving the final settlement, is also important on account 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at ¶ 2.6. 
 154. Id. at ¶ 4.18. 
 155. See In re Converium Holding AG Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 7897, 2006 WL 
3804619 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2006). 
 156. Hof’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. JS Kortmann 
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO3908] (Scor Holding/Interim Decision) (Neth.) 
[hereinafter Converium I] (translated by author). 
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of its discussion and approval of a contingency fee.157 The 
20% contingency fee modelled on the American practice 
represents an important advance for the synthetic class 
action, because it allows attorneys to push forward these 
cases with the hope of winning an award based on the size of 
the final judgment.158 
Converium was a Swiss reinsurance firm with its 
common stock trading on the Swiss Stock Exchange and 
ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange.159 In 2001, it was 
spun off from its parent company, Zurich Financial Services, 
in an IPO. Although Converium increased its reserves before 
the IPO by a total of $112 million, earlier estimates 
performed by actuarial consultants found that it was under-
reserved by $350 million.160 Its December 11, 2001 IPO was 
the largest IPO ever of a reinsurer, with 35 million shares 
sold for $1.76 billion. In the years to follow, however, its 
financial woes continued. On July 20, 2004, it announced a 
$400 million charge due to a required increase in its North 
American unit’s reserves.161 This news led to an immediate 
collapse in its stock price of nearly 50%. A number of 
plaintiffs then brought class action lawsuits in U.S. Federal 
court against Converium, Zurich Financial Services, and the 
IPO underwriters UBS and Merrill Lynch. The lawsuits were 
consolidated and assigned to the Southern District of New 
York in 2006. After Judge Cote granted defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the claims of non-U.S. investors under the pre-
 
 157. Hof’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. BJ de Jong 
[ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BV1026] (Scor Holding) (Neth.) [hereinafter Converium 
II] (translated by author). 
 158. What amounts to a contingency fee was in fact paid to the law firm Grant 
& Eisenhofer in Shell Petroleum, so this was not strictly speaking the first WCAM 
securities settlement involving such a payment. See Hensler, supra note 2, at 318. 
The Converium II judgment is important however for its explicit treatment and 
blessing of a contingency fee to be paid to the non-Dutch attorneys. 
 159. See In re Converium Holding, 2006 WL 3804619 at *22. 
 160. See id. at *4. 
 161. See id. at *21. 
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Morrison conduct test,162 a Dutch stichting was formed to 
pursue a WCAM settlement. 
In 2008, the American investors reached an $85 million 
settlement with SCOR, the successor by merger to 
Converium, and Zurich Financial Services.163 
Representatives of the Dutch investors and SCOR reached 
an agreement on the non-U.S. claims on July 8, 2010.164 
When they petitioned the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to 
declare the settlement binding, the court allowed them the 
opportunity to first receive a provisional judgment 
concerning the court’s jurisdiction in the case before the 
interested parties, the shareholders, would be served notice 
of a hearing on the substance of the petition.165 The 
petitioners accepted this proposal, and on November 12, 
2010 the court issued its first opinion.  
The connection with the Netherlands was significantly 
less than in Shell Petroleum. Converium was a Swiss 
corporation that had merged into SCOR Holding AG, another 
Swiss corporation. Prior to the merger, Converium shares 
traded on the SWX exchange in Switzerland, with ADRs 
trading on the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE). 
Furthermore, of the approximately 12,000 stockholders 
excluded from the U.S. class action, only 200 were known to 
be domiciled in the Netherlands.166 There were also 
approximately 8,500 Swiss shareholders and 1,500 
shareholders domiciled in the United Kingdom.167 The court 
 
 162. In re Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 163. See Converium Holding Case 08/29/2008, SHAREHOLDERS FOUNDATION, 
Aug. 29, 2008. (The total loss of Converium market capitalization on July 20, 
2008 was approximately $1 billion, and by the first week of September 
Converium shares had dropped to $8.86 from $25.02 six weeks earlier. See also 
In re Converium Holding, 2006 WL 3804619, at *21–22.)  
 164. See Converium I, ¶ 1. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at ¶ 2.3. 
 167. Id. 
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was thus faced with the question of determining jurisdiction 
over a non-Dutch petitioner, SCOR Holding, and the 
shareholders or “interested parties” from the Netherlands, 
elsewhere in the E.U., and outside the E.U.  
The court begins its jurisdictional analysis by noting that 
the proceedings before it are “a civil and commercial matter 
as referred to in Article 1(1) of the EEX Regulation—the 
Brussels I Regulation—and the EVEX Convention” (or the 
Lugano Convention).168 Under Brussels I, Art. 5, jurisdiction 
is proper “with the court of the place where the obligations 
under the agreements are to be performed.”169 Since the 
Dutch foundation (the Stichting Converium Securities 
Compensation Foundation) will be responsible for 
distributing the settlement amounts, this will occur in the 
Netherlands. As for the interested parties whose rights will 
be foreclosed by this settlement, jurisdiction is proper over 
those shareholders domiciled in the Netherlands under 
Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.170 For non-Dutch 
shareholders domiciled in the European Union or a Lugano 
convention state—most importantly Switzerland, but also 
Iceland and Norway—jurisdiction is proper under Article 6, 
preamble and (1), of Brussels I and the Lugano 
Convention.171 The court emphasizes here that because the 
settlement closes off other avenues of redress for parties who 
don’t opt-out, “[t]here for this reason exists such a close 
connection between these claims that the sound 
administration of justice requires the claims to be 
simultaneously heard and judged in order to avoid 
incompatible court decisions in the event that the claims 
were to be individually adjudicated.”172 Thus, just as in Shell 
Petroleum, by referring to the “close connection” that is set 
 
 168. Id. at ¶ 2.7.  
 169. Id. at ¶ 2.8. 
 170. Id. at ¶ 2.10. 
 171. Id. at ¶ 2.11. 
 172. Id. 
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forth in the Brussels I Regulation, Art. 6(1), the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of the 
foundational principle of justice of that mandates treating 
like cases alike.173 
Finally, for shareholders not domiciled in the 
Netherlands, the E.U., or in a Lugano Convention state, 
jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Article 3 of the Dutch Code 
of Civil Procedure (the “DCCP” or Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering), preamble and sections (a) and (c), in 
conjunction with DCCP Section 1013(3). This is because the 
obligations of the parties to the petition are to be performed 
in the Netherlands, and the involvement of the Foundation 
“means the matter is sufficiently connected to the Dutch 
legal order.” Through this expansive interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the regulations governing 
international private law  jurisdiction, as well as the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure, the court finds jurisdiction in a case 
where the responsible parties as well as the vast majority of 
shareholders are located outside the Netherlands.174  
The court’s discussion of the parallel litigation in the 
Southern District of New York demonstrates that, in the 
wake of Morrison, it understands its role as complementary 
 
 173. Brussels I, Art. 6(1) reads: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. Where he is 
one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one 
of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it 
is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings . . . . 
Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC), on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
 174. See Xandra E. Kramer, Enforcing Mass Settlements in the European 
Judicial Area: EU Policy and the Strange Case of the Dutch Collective Settlements 
(WCAM) in RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 
79–82 (Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler, eds., 2013) (discussing the broad 
assertion of worldwide jurisdiction on the part of the Converium court, and 
concluding “[i]t is submitted that the way in which the Amsterdam Court 
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to that of the U.S. court. The Dutch court notes that the 
WCAM provides a means to give a binding settlement “for 
the benefit of persons with respect to which the District 
Court declined jurisdiction,” and so together the Dutch and 
the American actions amount to “mutually complementing 
settlements.”175   
Converium’s other major legal advance is the court’s 
explicit approval of an amount equal to 20% of the total 
settlement ($58.4 x .2 =  $11.68 million) to be paid to the 
American counsel in the case.176 While the shareholders 
objected to this amount, the court noted that it is appropriate 
under Dutch law to consider what is appropriate and 
reasonable in the United States.177 While the total amount of 
the settlement here is much smaller than in its predecessor, 
Shell Petroleum, the discussion and approval of an 
American-style contingency award for the foreign lawyers 
performing much of the work on the case is crucial because 
it sets into place one of the key economic elements allowing 
for the development of the “synthetic class action.”178 
4. Fortis 
The Fortis litigation arose out of an expensive, ill-fated 
banking merger prior to the global financial crisis. The Fortis 
settlement is important both for its massive size—at 1.2 
billion euros, it is the largest ever in a securities case outside 
the U.S.179—and the nuanced treatment the court offers of 
its financial ramifications for different parties in the 
agreement. Fortis demonstrates that the WCAM offers 
 
 175. Id. at ¶ 2.6. 
 176. Converium II, ¶ 6.5.1. 
 177. Converium II, ¶ 6.5.2. 
 178. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 190 (discussing financing structures of WCAM 
actions). 
 179. Kevin La Croix, Dutch Court Declares Largest-Ever European Investor 
Claims Settlement Binding, THE D&O DIARY (July 30, 2018), https://www. 
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corporate defendants a valuable means of settling 
shareholder litigation, as well as recognition of the benefits 
and appropriateness of American-style contingency fee 
awards in the international context. 
Fortis N.V./S.A. was a Dutch/Belgian bank with its 
customer base in the Benelux countries. The claims against 
it grew out of its involvement in 2007 with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Santander Bank in acquiring the assets of ABN 
AMRO, a leading Dutch bank. The three financial 
institutions paid 71.9 billion euros (U.S. $101 billion) for 
ABN AMRO in October 2007 and then split its assets, with 
Fortis taking those located in the Netherlands.180 When the 
financial crisis struck a year later, Fortis’s assets were 
already depleted from the acquisition at the same time that 
it suffered substantial losses on structured finance securities 
backed by U.S. mortgages. The value of its shares collapsed 
from 22 euros in September 2007 to 1 euro in October 
2008,181 and the Dutch government stepped in with a bailout 
in October 2008.182  
Shareholders filed a class action lawsuit in the Southern 
District of New York in October 2008 alleging that Fortis 
executives misstated the bank’s financial condition in 2007 
and 2008 and misrepresented the value of its structured 
finance assets. The U.S. lawsuit was dismissed in 2010 for 
failing to meet the standards outlined in the conduct and 
effects test.183 Lawyers representing various groups of 
shareholders then pursued actions in Belgium and the 
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(Oct. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/business/worldbusiness/09 
bank.html. 
 181. The plaintiffs argued for a class period in the U.S. case from September 
17, 2007 to October 14, 2008. See Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 500 
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 183. See Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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Netherlands.184 (These lawsuits were not brought under the 
WCAM, but DCCP 3:305 which allows for an opt-in mass 
claim to determine liability.) The successor entity to Fortis, 
Ageas S.A., agreed to a settlement with four shareholder 
representatives in June 2017. When the parties petitioned 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for approval, however, the 
settlement was rejected.185 The court objected in particular 
to the fact that the compensation scheme awarded 
shareholders who had actively participated in bringing the 
claim a substantially larger award (approximately 50%) than 
non-participating shareholders. It also objected to the lack of 
transparency concerning the fees that would be awarded to 
the shareholder representatives. 
The parties refashioned the settlement agreement and 
petitioned the court once more. On July 13, 2018, the court 
approved the 1.2 billion euro settlement.186 In addition to its 
massive amount, it is important in its treatment of the 
compensation awarded to both shareholders and the 
organizations representing them. Unlike the first proposal, 
the final settlement awards active and passive shareholders 
compensation in equal measure. The court explained that the 
intent behind the WCAM is to prevent parties experiencing 
a loss from having to institute separate legal proceedings, 
and that allowing separate recovery amounts would work 
against this.187 Moreover, parties are entitled to “await the 
outcome of a collective settlement” before deciding on 
whether to institute their own proceedings.188 
Discrimination against passive claimants would hinder both 
of these policies motivating the WCAM. 
 
 184. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1902 n.24. 
 185. Hof’s-Amsterdam 16 juni 2017, JOR 2018, 10 m.nt. Kortman (Ageas 
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 187. Id. ¶ 5.1.3. 
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2020] GLOBAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 525 
On the other hand, the court allowed for an additional 
25% compensation in the form of a “cost addition” to go to 
active claimants.189 This amount is awarded to reimburse 
these shareholders for the time and expense incurred in 
bringing the claims to a resolution. Furthermore, a “success 
fee” awarded to the shareholder representatives indirectly 
allows the litigation funders and lawyers to be paid on a 
contingency basis.190 As the court explains, claimants 
registered with FortisEffect will pay a result-dependent fee 
of 10% to FortisEffect; those registered with SICAF will pay 
a 25% fee, and institutional investors with Deminor a 21% 
fee (on average).191 Shareholders registered with VEB also 
pay significant fees. The court explains that the fee 
arrangements of the shareholder representatives involve 
either significant risk on the part of the organization (in the 
case of VEB and Deminor) or third-party funding in the case 
of FortisEffect and SICAF. The additional compensation for 
active claimants is deemed reasonable, and so acceptable 
under WCAM.192 In addition to its record-breaking amount, 
then, Fortis is important as it confirms the policy of the 
Converium court to allow litigation funding on a contingency 
basis, as long as any amounts paid are reasonable and do not 
appear to detract from the amount paid to claimants. While 
the court’s insistence on equal base compensation for passive 
and active shareholders alike drew criticism from the 
plaintiffs’ bar that it ignored the problem of “free-riding” 
shareholders,193 it does allow for compensation of costs that 
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include significant contingent amounts.194  
Where Fortis breaks new legal ground is in its use of a 
two-step litigation strategy.195 This first involves obtaining a 
declaratory judgment against the issuer under DCCP 3:305, 
then using that judgment as leverage in negotiating a global 
settlement under the WCAM. After the U.S. case against 
Fortis was dismissed, various shareholder representatives 
pursued judgments in the Belgian and Dutch courts.196 Since 
there was substantial connection to the Netherlands because 
Fortis and ABN/AMRO were Dutch banks, these claims 
could not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, as later 
happened with British Petroleum. The actions filed in the 
Belgian and Dutch courts thus operated to give the 
shareholder representatives substantial leverage before the 
case progressed to negotiations for a settlement to be brought 
under the WCAM. The Fortis settlement is therefore 
important due to its massive size, its approval of third-party 
litigation funding structures compensating entrepreneurial 
lawyers, and the preliminary use of DCCP 3:305 to compel 
the issuer to reach a settlement.  
5. Petrobras 
While still ongoing, the Petrobras litigation is both 
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for $2.95 billion in June 2018197—and legally important. The 
securities fraud claims are based in the “Operação Lava 
Jato” corruption scandal at Petrobras, the Brazilian oil 
company. Petrobras executives were accused of participating 
in rigged auctions for contracts with suppliers.198 When the 
company paid inflated prices on construction projects and 
acquisitions of property, 1–5% of the total price would be 
transferred back to the executives. The executives, who were 
appointed at the behest of the ruling coalition’s political 
parties, also transferred funds to their respective parties. 
When news of the scandal broke in 2014, the market 
capitalization of Petrobras fell from $310 billion to $39 billion 
and the price of ADRs on Petrobras common stock traded on 
the NYSE fell by 80.92%.199 
Plaintiffs filed five separate class action lawsuits in the 
Southern District of New York alleging securities law 
violations. These were consolidated in February 2015 and 
assigned to Judge Jed Rakoff.200 In addition to the claims of 
investors who purchased securities in transactions meeting 
the Morrison criteria for admission to U.S. Federal court, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers also brought claims of non-U.S. investors 
under Brazilian law. Judge Rakoff dismissed the claims 
relating to securities purchased on the Brazilian Bovespa, as 
they were covered by Article 58 of Petrobras’s bylaws, which 
contained a mandatory arbitration provision.201 He declined, 
however, to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs purchasing 
Petrobras securities on the NYSE.202 These purchasers 
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would not have consented to be bound by the arbitration 
provision in the Company’s bylaws, which covered “disputes 
. . . involving the Corporation, its shareholders, [and] 
managers” arising from “the rules issued . . . by the Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores 
Mobiliários – CVM) as well as in all further [rules applicable] 
to the operation of the capital market in general.”203 As a 
result, the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part 
but denied in part. The claims of U.S. purchasers were 
allowed to proceed, and a class was certified.204 These claims 
settled in January 2018 for a whopping $2.95 billion, making 
it the fifth-largest securities class action settlement in U.S. 
history.205  
After the claims of purchasers on the Bovespa were 
dismissed, plaintiffs’ attorneys formed foundations in the 
Netherlands to pursue claims there but with reportedly little 
hope of success.206 Nevertheless, on September 19, 2018 their 
efforts led to an important preliminary victory. The 
Rotterdam District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction in a 
collective action for a declaratory judgment under Article 
3:305 of the Dutch Civil Code.207 Not surprisingly, the court 
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the Petrobras entities 
domiciled in the Netherlands, Petrobras Global Finance 
B.V., Petrobras Oil & Gas B.V., and Petrobras International 
Braspetro B.V.208 The court then determined that Article 7 
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of the DCCP provided it with jurisdiction over Petrobras in 
Brazil because some of the complaints “are so closely 
connected as to justify a joint hearing for reasons of 
efficiency, in order to prevent irreconcilable judgments from 
being given in the event that the cases were heard and 
determined separately.”209 
The Rotterdam court also ruled that the arbitration 
provision in the Petrobras bylaws did not preclude the Dutch 
courts from hearing the claims of investors purchasing their 
shares on the Bovespa. Contrary to Judge Rakoff, the 
Rotterdam court determined that “this text of article 58 
under Brazilian law does not satisfy the conditions to be 
imposed on it and is not valid.”210 The argument in favor of 
this interpretation turns on a rather fine point. The court 
found that the English languge translation of the Petrobras 
Articles of Association available on its website until 2014 
stated that “Disputes or controversies involving the 
Corporation, its shareholders, managers and members of the 
Audit Board shall be resolved according to the rules of the 
Market Arbitration Chamber . . . .”211 It did not however 
explicitly state that any such disputes be resolved in 
arbitration, as its revised translation later did: “It shall be 
resolved by means of arbitration, obeying the rules provided 
by the Market Arbitration Chamber . . . .”212 The court 
therefore ruled that the original English-language text 
available to investors on the Petrobras website “is the only 
version which is of significance to the present issue on 
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jurisdiction.”213 Since Brazilian law provides that access to 
the national courts is a fundamental right, the court held 
that the text should clearly and specifically state that any 
disputes must not be put before the national court, but before 
an arbitral tribunal.214 Since the English language 
translation of Article 58 failed to do so, the court ruled that 
Article 58 was invalid under Brazilian law.215 
With this determination, the proceedings against 
Petrobras were allowed to continue. To be sure, these are 
preliminary actions that can only result in a determination 
of liability, not a monetary judgment. Such a proceeding, 
however, can be an important precursor to pursuing a 
settlement against corporate defendants. While the U.S. 
Petrobras settlement is noteworthy for its massive size, so 
far the Dutch proceeding is noteworthy for its disregard of an 
arbitration provision that the U.S. court upheld. 
6. Failed Settlements and the Limits of the WCAM: 
British Petroleum and Rabobank  
In addition to the settlements reviewed above, and the 
ongoing Petrobras action, two failed attempts to reach a 
settlement are important. For shareholders and their legal 
representatives they stand as warnings, demonstrating the 
limits of the WCAM. When initial settlement negotiations 
fail, the foundation backing the claims is forced to apply to 
the Dutch courts for a declaratory judgment under DCC 
3:305. This provision was added to the Dutch Civil Code in 
1994 and allows a foundation or association to obtain a 
classwide determination of liability against a corporation.216 
A DCC 3:305 action does not allow for a classwide monetary 
judgment, however, nor does it have res judicata effect in 
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further proceedings by individual parties.217 Nevertheless, 
its statement of liability can be valuable to shareholders and 
a DCC 3:305 action is often used as a first step in the WCAM 
settlement process.218 For shareholders forced to travel this 
route, though, these two recent cases demonstrate its 
pitfalls.  
The British Petroleum (BP) case concerns losses relating 
to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster and associated 
disclosure both before and after the oil spill on the part of BP. 
In June 2016, BP agreed to pay $175 million to settle claims 
in a U.S Federal class action lawsuit.219 In their attempted 
parallel claim in the Netherlands, non-U.S. shareholders 
could not reach an agreement with BP. When the 
negotiations failed, VEB turned to the Amsterdam District 
Court, seeking a declaration under DCC 3:305(a) that would 
establish BP’s liability. Such a declaration would then lend 
support to the claims of individual shareholders in court 
(although causality in each individual claim would still need 
to be established), or more likely, reopen settlement 
negotiations with an eye to bringing an agreed upon 
settlement before the Amsterdam Court of Appeals. 
In September 2016, the Amsterdam District Court ruled 
that it lacked jurisdiction in the case.220 Under European 
Union law, as explained in Universal Music in 2016 , tort 
actions must be brought in the Member State where either 
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the defendant is domiciled or the harmful event occurred.221 
The location of a harmful event is furthermore subdivided 
into two categories: either the location of the event giving rise 
to the damages (the Handlungsort), or the place where the 
initial damages occurred (the Erfolgsort).222 Since the oil spill 
at the center of the BP litigation occurred in the Gulf of 
Mexico, VEB argued that the damages occurred in the 
Netherlands, since the securities accounts of Dutch 
shareholders were located there. Relying on the European 
Court of Justice’s Universal Music decision, the Amsterdam 
District Court determined that the location of a securities 
account alone, without other factors connecting it to the 
event, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
British Petroleum thus illustrates the secondary line of 
defense available to a corporation accused of wrongdoing. 
Because the jurisdictional requirements for parties bringing 
an action under DCC 3:305(a) are much more restrictive 
than those at play in approving a settlement under the 
WCAM, plaintiffs are deprived of an important point of 
leverage when settlement negotiations fail. When compared 
to the American class action context Article 3:305 reinforces 
the general position of strength of a putative defendant (in 
the American sense) under the WCAM. The corporation is 
free to walk away from settlement negotiations that, from its 
perspective at least, do not appear to be leading to a 
beneficial outcome. 
While not a securities case, the Rabobank litigation 
illustrates a different pitfall for shareholders and their 
lawyers. In 2015, a foundation formed by Dutch attorney 
Pieter Lijesen filed a collective action under DCC 3:305 on 
behalf of its members against Rabobank.223 The claim was 
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based on alleged insufficient disclosure of the risks 
associated with interest rate swaps sold from 2005 to 2011 
by Rabobank. Over 8,000 swaps were sold to enterprises that 
wanted to hedge against interest rate risk on floating rate 
loans. The Foundation claimed that in addition to engaging 
in manipulation of the EURIBOR and LIBOR rates, 
Rabobank failed to meet its duty of care in properly 
informing customers of the risks associated with the swaps.   
Rabobank successfully argued that the Foundation did 
not sufficiently protect the interests of the parties for whom 
the claim was filed.224 Until December 2015, when Rabobank 
objected in its reply to the Foundation’s original claim, 
Attorney Lijesen was the only director of the Foundation and 
there was no supervisory board.225 Furthermore, the 
Foundation was set up solely to pursue these claims, and 
Lijesen appeared to be in the business of setting up claims 
foundations to pursue like cases. The court determined that 
the structure of the Foundation was insufficient to protect 
the claims of the enterprises for which it was ostensibly 
acting. Furthermore, the various claims were improperly 
bundled together under 3:305(a). Not only did the various 
swaps differ in important ways, the individual circumstances 
leading to an alleged violation of the duty of care were 
sufficiently different to render a bundled claim improper. 
The court thus declared the Foundation’s claim inadmissible 
under DCP 3:305(a).226 
Rabobank and British Petroleum thus illustrate that 
when shareholders attempt to pursue a declaration of 
liability on a class-wide basis, their claims can fail due to 
insufficient contact with the Netherlands, a Foundation that 
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(Foundation of Interest Flash Claim/Cooperative Rabobank U.A.)(Neth.), ¶ 5.22.   
 225. Id. ¶ 5.24. 
 226. Id. ¶ 5.56. 
534 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
does not adequately safeguard the interests of its purported 
beneficiaries, or what American lawyers would think of as a 
lack of commonality of claims. While these pitfalls are not 
within the WCAM itself, they are obstacles that a foundation 
or association will face when it seeks a determination of 
liability as a preliminary step to entering into settlement 
negotiations. Without such a determination, particularly 
where the defendant does not face obvious and certain 
liabilities, or at least legal costs, settlement negotiations may 
be inconclusive. These cases therefore illustrate a second-
line threat to the viability of a WCAM action.227 
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III. IN COMPARISON: THE WCAM AND THE AMERICAN 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION 
Since its enactment in 2005, a handful of securities cases 
have come under the WCAM: four settlements, one ongoing 
major action, and at least one failed attempt at a settlement 
in a major case. During the same period, over 2,000 “core” 
securities class actions (excluding M&A-related actions) 
have come before the U.S. federal courts.228 Despite the small 
number of cases on the Dutch side, it is possible to draw some 
lines of comparison. The vast disparity in numbers points to 
the most important difference. Since it does not offer 
shareholders a cause of action but merely a settlement 
mechanism, only the very strongest claims are likely to lead 
to settlement under the WCAM. Beneath this crucial 
difference, however, are some crucial similarities. Most 
importantly, the familiar criticisms of the American 
securities fraud class action on account of its circularity and 
questionable deterrent effect also apply to the Dutch regime.   
This combination of similarity and difference leads to a 
mixed appraisal of the WCAM. Since it does not provide a 
basis to determine liability and damages in a mass claim, the 
WCAM leads to a radical reduction in the amount of 
securities cases brought before the courts. For the harsher 
critics of the American system, this result in itself will likely 
be something to cheer. On the other hand, since the 
settlements under the WCAM replicate the core problems 
with the American class action, the Dutch system fails as a 
more sophisticated advance over the American one. This 
failure points towards some final political-economic 
reflections. The emergence of the WCAM as an alternative to 
the American courts was a result of a confluence of factors. 
Jurisprudential considerations on the part of the American 
and Dutch courts, the economic benefits of a global 
settlement to multi-national corporations, and the 
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unintended application of the WCAM statute to securities 
cases have all played causal roles. Law, economics, and 
serendipity all figure into the development of the global 
synthetic securities class action. 
A. Altering the Balance of Power 
The most important difference between the WCAM and 
the American securities fraud class action concerns the 
bargaining power of defendants (here used in the American 
sense) in the respective systems. Since the Dutch WCAM 
does not offer a cause of action but only a mechanism for all 
parties to petition the court to give binding effect to a 
settlement already agreed upon, the WCAM shifts power 
decisively to the corporation who would be the defendant in 
an American class action.229 
Under the WCAM, a corporation faces no immediate 
threat that it will lose a litigation on the merits because the 
WCAM does not offer a means to determine liability. Any 
threat to the corporation is therefore substantially more 
remote. It may have to defend against individual claims, but 
it is always free to walk away if it does not feel further 
negotiations will lead to what it perceives to be an 
advantageous resolution of the possible claims at stake.230 
(The British Petroleum case reviewed above appears to 
represent such a situation.231) The only real consequence to 
walking away will be that the company remains open to 
multiple individual claims.232 Depending on the ability of 
individual plaintiffs to bring such claims, and the liability 
the company might face under the law of the various 
shareholder jurisdictions, this is often a risk a corporation is 
willing to run. 
 
 229. See COFFEE, supra note 106, at 216–18. 
 230. See Krans, supra note 89, at 287–89 (discussing incentives in settlement 
negotiations); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1906. 
 231. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 868. 
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From the point of view of the corporate defendant, then, 
the negotiation process before a WCAM settlement can be 
considered a form of non-binding alternative dispute 
resolution.233 It allows for a settlement to be given 
conclusive, and preclusive, effect, but imposes no 
consequences if the corporation leaves the table. As 
compared to settlement talks before trial in an American 
securities fraud class action, the defendant here has the 
favorable position, with no immediate downside to rejecting 
a deal not perceived to be to its advantage. It is interesting 
to compare the WCAM statute to the proposal for 
replacement of securities fraud class actions by arbitration 
presented by Hal Scott and Leslie Silverman.234 They 
propose allowing corporations to adopt bylaw amendments 
which would replace the classwide securities fraud class 
action with binding arbitration. Their proposal differs from 
the WCAM in that it provides for binding, not non-binding, 
arbitration, and it also mandates individual, not class-wide 
or consolidated arbitration. The WCAM does not go as far as 
the Scott and Silverman proposal in shifting power to the 
defendant, because WCAM settlement talks are entered into 
by representatives of many, if not most, of a company’s 
shareholders, but the binding nature of their arbitration 
proposal would force a defendant to live with an adverse 
decision. 
Given that the balance of power in a WCAM negotiation 
greatly favors the corporation allegedly causing harm, what 
could induce it to settle? Recall that in Shell Petroleum, 
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settlement of the parallel action in U.S. federal court was 
conditioned upon reaching a settlement of the global claims 
outside the United States.235 In Converium, non-U.S 
shareholders had been dismissed from the U.S. action but 
were able to press their claim in negotiations with the new 
parent company SCOR.236 And in Fortis, shareholder 
representatives successfully pressed individual actions 
under DCCP 3:305 as a preliminary to a WCAM 
settlement.237 In all these cases a settlement under the 
WCAM offered the corporation the prospect of a final 
resolution to the dispute. Because a judgment approved by 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals will be enforced throughout 
Europe through the Brussels regulation on the enforceability 
of judgments, the main benefit offered to an alleged corporate 
wrongdoer by the WCAM mechanism is the prospect of 
finality.238  
As a consequence of the balance of power between 
shareholders and corporations under the WCAM, only the 
strongest cases are likely to result in a settlement. If a claim 
is weak due to either the facts or the law in non-U.S. 
jurisdictions, the benefits to a corporation are likely to be too 
small for a settlement to offer an attractive means of 
resolving a case.239 This shift in the balance of power in turn 
explains the vast difference in the number of American 
securities litigations and WCAM settlements. For many 
critics of the American securities class action this will be 
something to cheer. The WCAM does not give would-be 
plaintiffs the ability to launch in terrorem litigation designed 
to force a settlement, but it does offer defendants an avenue 
 
 235. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Arons & van Boom, supra note 195, at 865–68; Kaal & Painter, supra 
note 83, at 167. 
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to a global settlement where the price is right.240 While it 
allows lawyers to create a synthetic class action, the WCAM 
does not open the floodgates to vexatious litigation. For those 
who see at least some value in the American system, though, 
the WCAM may be viewed with caution.241 
B. The Problems of Circularity and Deterrence 
Beneath this overarching difference, similarities 
between the Dutch and the American systems emerge. Most 
importantly, the problems surrounding the justification of 
the American securities class action that have been the 
subject of extensive discussion over recent decades are 
replicated under the WCAM. Because the payments to 
shareholders and their representatives come from the 
companies themselves, the problem of circularity is present 
in the Dutch settlements. And just as in the American 
context, the nature of the deterrent effect a settlement may 
have on corporate executives is unclear. While the WCAM 
greatly reduces the total incidence of claims against 
corporations, it fails to offer any improvement on the two 
most important questions concerning the economic efficacy 
as well as the justice of the American securities class action. 
Circularity is the lynchpin of the economic critique of the 
securities fraud class action. It stems from the realization 
that, unlike in other types of class actions, any recovery to 
shareholders who have been harmed by corporate 
misrepresentations or fraud is ultimately funded by the 
shareholders themselves.242 In this general sense, then, a 
securities class action represents a circular flow of money 
 
 240. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 83, at 167.  
 241. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 106, at 216–17; see also Hensler, supra note 
2, at 312. 
 242. See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities 
Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 337; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the 
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from one group of shareholders to another, with lawyers for 
the plaintiffs taking a significant cut in the form of a 
contingency fee.243 Defense counsel are paid for by the 
shareholders as well. Despite this circularity, a securities 
class action can result in meaningful compensation for 
certain shareholder groups.244 When shareholders who 
purchased at prices inflated by fraud are compensated for the 
difference in the price they purchased at and the “true value” 
of the shares, they are made whole. Nevertheless, unlike in 
other types of mass actions, the unique structure of the 
securities fraud class action means that the flow of funds is 
fundamentally circular, in that it runs from one group of 
shareholders to another.245 
The phenomenon of circularity has both economic and 
moral aspects. Economically, circularity should be seen as a 
reduction in the efficiency of the compensatory function of 
the securities fraud class action rather than its complete 
negation.246 From the point of view of shareholders who have 
exited their investments, complete compensation is in 
principle possible. Nevertheless there is always some 
circularity in the sense that the amounts paid ultimately 
come from the shareholders themselves (barring the unusual 
case where decisionmakers are forced to pay personally). And 
even if direct compensation and legal costs are paid by 
insurance, it is the shareholders who pay the premiums on 
the insurance policies. The irreducible economic aspect of 
 
 243. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, 
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(2007) (stating that legal costs account for approximately 50% of the cost of the 
securities class action remedy). 
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circularity is that amounts paid in compensation and legal 
fees are ultimately paid for by shareholders. 
The fact that the shareholders paying compensation and 
legal bills are innocent of any wrongdoing gives the problem 
of circularity a moral sting. In the typical mass tort case, for 
example, the shareholders of a corporation that pays a 
judgment to the victims of its actions have indirectly 
benefitted from the tortious act because the company would 
have made money from selling an unsafe product or 
manufacturing products in violation of environmental 
regulations, for example. In a securities fraud mass action, 
however, those funding the recovery—the present 
shareholders of the company, who either retained their 
shares or purchased them after an incident of securities 
fraud—cannot be said to be beneficiaries of any 
wrongdoing.247 It is typically the executives who have 
benefitted, for example by earning large bonuses because the 
company’s stock price was kept artifically high, not the 
shareholders who have continued to hold their stock in the 
company. Morally, the shareholders who retain their stock 
are as blameless as those shareholders being compensated, 
with the only difference that those receiving compensation 
happened to buy or sell their corporate shares during the 
class period.248 Adding to the problem of innocent 
shareholders funding securities fraud recoveries is the make-
up of the different classes of shareholders. A large portion of 
the shareholders who receive compensation will be short-
term traders such as hedge funds, while buy and hold 
investors are often less sophisticated “Main Street” 
investors.249 This adds a political dimension to the perceived 
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moral injury of a circular shareholder recovery.250   
Circularity has been the heart of the critique of the 
American securities class action, and commentators such as 
Fox who accept the deterrence rationale often conclude that 
the compensatory rationale is weak.251 Turning to the 
WCAM, it is not surprising that it offers no improvement on 
the American securities class action as far as the 
compensatory rationale is concerned. Its origins as a 
mechanism to enable mass settlement of more traditional 
tort claims means that it fails to deal with the problem of 
circularity. The WCAM settlement is therefore open to the 
same critique as its American counterpart. While it may be 
too much to expect that the legislature or judges in a foreign 
jurisdiction such as the Netherlands thoroughly investigate 
the possible problems in applying a mass claims statute to a 
type of case it was not originally designed for, the WCAM 
securities settlements replicate the circularity inherent in 
their American counterparts.  
Deterrence is the other main justification for the 
securities class action. The threat of a lawsuit, the argument 
goes, will have a deterrent effect that incentivizes accurate 
statements and disclosure on the part of the company and its 
executives. While it is hard to measure the deterrent effect 
of such a threat, if real it presents a solid justification for the 
present system.252 Unfortunately, just as with the 
compensation rationale, even if in theory there is a deterrent 
effect, a number of factors serve to weaken its force in 
practice. Most importantly, the actors whose statements give 
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rise to a securities class action are typically insulated from 
any personal liability for their misstatements.253 Under the 
terms of an insurance policy covering such a settlement it is 
important that the corporate executives not admit 
intentional or even reckless wrongdoing.254 A recovery for the 
plaintiffs then requires that the executives responsible for a 
misstatement not admit to any wrongful conduct. The 
structural imperative that decisionmakers not assume 
personal responsibility thus directly cuts against the 
possibility of a securities class action actually having a 
deterrent effect. Plaintiffs’ lawyers will not be able to recover 
in most securities class action lawsuits if they pursue a claim 
resulting in personal liability.  
The Dutch securities settlements concluded so far are 
unsurprisingly devoid of any discussion of the deterrent 
effect to be had from the threat of a securities fraud claim. 
First, the focus of the WCAM is on compensation of victims 
and the corresponding benefit of finality that a settlement 
brings to the alleged wrongdoer.255 Second, because the 
WCAM does not involve a cause of action, there is no direct 
threat against a would-be wrongdoer, only the benefit of a 
possible settlement. While the arguments for a deterrence 
rationale in the American context should hold good in the 
Dutch context,256 they are rather far removed from the 
practicalities of the individual settlements thus far 
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concluded under the WCAM. 
C. Lawyers’ Incentives 
A strong line of criticism of the American securities class 
action concerns the structural incentives it creates for 
lawyers, particularly those representing the plaintiffs. In 
short, the criticism is that the American system of lawyer-
driven mass actions incentivizes lawyers to work for their 
own interests, not those of their clients.257 It also incentivizes 
nuisance claims or “strike suits,” where claims are filed in 
weak cases simply to extract a settlement out of the 
defendants. Given that there is substantial evidence to 
support at least some version of these criticisms, do the same 
problems arise under the WCAM? What incentives do 
lawyers have here, and how are shareholders’ interests 
protected? Furthermore, can the WCAM mechanism lead to 
a “race to the bottom” where competing shareholder 
representatives can engage in a reverse auction to settle the 
claims at the lowest possible cost to the defendant?  
Like other European jurisdictions, the ban on 
contingency-fee lawyering in the Netherlands prevents 
lawyers from receiving a fee based on their success in 
resolving the claim.258 Nevertheless, the securities cases 
resolved under the WCAM are funded by third-party 
litigation funders, often hedge funds, and the settlement 
amounts paid to the claimant representative organizations 
include a “success fee,” so in practice they do represent a type 
of contingency-fee lawyering. To work around the Dutch 
rules governing legal practice and the potential imposition of 
“loser-pays” fee shifting, a complex funding structure is 
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used.259 First, the Dutch attorneys working on the case are 
paid their standard hourly rate, as required by Dutch rules 
governing the practice of law. The claimant organizations 
such as VEB, Deminor, and the various stichtings involved 
in each case enter into funding agreements with third-party 
litigation funders. The funder covers the upfront costs of the 
litigation in exchange for a large slice (estimated at 40–50%) 
of the settlement if successful.260 Crucially, a claimant 
organization also purchases an insurance policy protecting it 
against the imposition of litigation costs in a “loser-pays” 
system in case the claim is unsuccessful.261 This structure 
provides for the essential work-around of the Dutch rules 
against contingency-fee lawyering thereby allowing for 
something like an American class action lawsuit. The 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals has specifically blessed this, 
noting that the use of third-party litigation funding in these 
cases enables them to go forward and is therefore justified on 
public policy grounds.262 
Given this structure, the incentives of lawyers in the 
Dutch actions in the end approximate those in the American 
system. While the rules against contingency fees insulate the 
Dutch attorneys from the specific incentives governing their 
American counterparts, since they are paid their standard 
hourly rate, entrepreneurial American law firms such as 
Grant & Eisenhofer have played an important role in these 
cases as well. Since their compensation is determined by 
their success or failure in achieving a settlement for their 
clients, they will be subject to similar incentives as in their 
cases in the U.S. Indeed, a look at the details of the three 
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most important WCAM settlement cases shows similar 
results as in American securities fraud class actions. These 
results have two different implications for fears that the 
WCAM mechanism may facilitate a “race to the bottom” of 
competing plaintiffs’ attorneys. Within the Dutch system 
itself there are substantial safeguards protecting against a 
race to the bottom, including both the oversight of the courts 
and economic factors surrounding the representation of 
shareholders. On an international basis, however, there is 
the possibility that defendants can use a Dutch settlement to 
undermine a settlement more advantageous to shareholders 
in another jurisdiction. (Indeed, in Shell Petroleum this 
arguably occurred.) 
A look at the fee amounts in the major Dutch settlements 
is instructive. In Shell Petroleum, lawyers handling both the 
U.S. claims and the foreign claims dismissed under the then-
prevailing conduct test received separate fee awards. The 
Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz firm received a fee award of 
$30 million for its work in the U.S. case, which had total 
damages of approximately $89 million that RDS paid to 
settle the U.S. claims.263 They also negotiated a fee of $27 
million with RDS for their work on the global claims prior to 
their dismissal, which the court approved.264 In the global 
case settled under the WCAM, Grant & Eisenhofer received 
a fee of approximately $50 million. Such an amount comes to 
a total of $107 million in legal fees on total awards in both 
cases of $471 million. If the legal fees are added to the total 
award, coming to a figure of $578 million, legal fees would 
comprise 18.5% of the total amount.265  
Such amounts are on the high side for American 
securities class action settlements in this range, but not 
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outside the realm of the ordinary.266 Aside from the fee 
amounts, however, there is another aspect to the case which 
Professors Coffee and Hensler each explore.267 Through its 
representation of major institutional investors, Grant & 
Eisenhofer essentially intervened in the U.S. case by opening 
negotiations for a global non-U.S. settlement with Royal 
Dutch/Shell. This intervention likely led to lower total costs 
to RDS, and, at least in Professor Coffee’s estimation, raises 
the prospect of a race to the bottom on the international 
level.268 In this precedent-setting case, where the U.S. 
settlement was conditioned upon the global non-U.S. 
settlement in the Netherlands, this fear is justified. 
Nevertheless, RDS shareholders received a total of $471 
million. Relying on the testimony of expert witnesses Allen 
Ferrell and Michael Perino that its fee award comprises 
between 9.79% and 12.46% of the estimated damages for 
non-U.S. plaintiffs, the Dutch court characterizes this as a 
reasonable and even generous award.269 Compared to the 
average award in an American securities class action, this 
judgment is undoubtedly correct.270 
Converium likewise involves ordinary fee awards in both 
the U.S. and the Dutch actions. In the U.S. case, plaintiffs’ 
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attorneys were awarded 20% (plus $4.5 mil. of litigation 
expenses) of the total award of $84.6 million.271 In the Dutch 
settlement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals likewise 
approved a total settlement of $58.4 million, with 20% of that 
amount going to the Principal Counsel, the trio of U.S. law 
firms handling the American litigation and assisting in the 
Dutch litigation.272 Converium is noteworthy for its explicit 
discussion of this contingency fee award. The court rejects 
the argument made by certain shareholder representatives 
that such an amount is excessive. It notes that much of the 
work was in fact performed in the U.S. by Principal Counsel, 
and declares that under Dutch law “it is possible to take 
account of that which is customary in the U.S. and is seen as 
reasonable.”273 Also important is the Converium court’s 
discussion of the discrepancy in per share awards between 
the U.S. action and the Dutch one. The court acknowledges 
this, but finds that it reflects the fact that “the legal position 
of the non-U.S. exchange purchasers is substantially 
different from that of the U.S. exchange purchasers.”274 
The fees in the Fortis case also come to about the same 
amount, although in a significantly more complex context, as 
the four shareholder representatives—VEB, Deminor, 
FortisEffect, and SICAF—received varying amounts. The 
court rejected the first proposed settlement in part because 
of lack of transparency concerning fees, and also because the 
“active claimants” who had joined a shareholder 
representative group (and paid fees up front) would have 
received around 50% greater compensation amounts than 
the passive ones.275 The second settlement, which the court 
approved, paid shareholders the same amounts, plus a “cost 
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addition” to account for costs incurred by the active 
shareholders. The second settlement also approves of fees 
from Ageas (the successor to Fortis) totalling 45 mil. euros, 
“success fees” of approximately 83.5 mil. euros, and costs of 
29.6 mil. euros.276 In addition to this, FortisEffect members 
pay a fee of 10%, SICAF members 25%, and Deminor 
members 21%.277 VEB is non-profit. Given these numbers, a 
ballpark figure of 20% fees paid to representative 
organizations, their attorneys, and third-party litigation 
funders seems likely. This number in fact appears quite high 
for a case of this size, with a settlement value of $1.5 
billion.278 
The cost of these settlements to shareholders is on the 
high side then, particularly for Fortis shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the recovery and fee amounts do not appear 
outside the range of reasonable settlements (with the 
exception of Fortis). This suggests that within the context of 
the Netherlands, the WCAM is not leading to a “race to the 
bottom” on the part of competing representative 
organizations and their lawyers. The structure of the WCAM 
in fact appears to prevent this, because any representative 
organization or injured party can have a seat at the table and 
voice its opinion on a proposed settlement even if it has not 
been involved in settlement negotiations.279 While there may 
be grounds to suspect that the representative organizations 
are charging high fees for their services, as the Fortis court 
suggests, within the Netherlands itself the structure of the 
WCAM settlement process does not appear to simply allow 
for one organization to cut a deal at the lowest cost with a 
defendant and then have that declared binding on all 
claimants. 
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In addition to the procedural protection afforded to 
interested parties is the active role the WCAM gives to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals. Most important is the 
requirement under DCC 907(3) that the court find a 
settlement “reasonable.”280 While this term can mean 
different things to different parties, all the WCAM 
settlements so far find the court taking this requirement 
seriously.281 This reflects the position of the drafters of the 
statute that the court would play an active role to protect the 
interests of claimants. The open-ended nature of the term 
“reasonable” also allows for the court to factor in a broad 
range of considerations here, including the standard practice 
in American courts where contingency-fee lawyering in class 
actions prevails. 
On the whole, the interests of lawyers in the WCAM 
settlements roughly approximate those of lawyers in 
American securities class actions. While the Dutch lawyers 
are insulated from the pressures American attorneys have to 
settle cases, at times in conflict with their clients’ interests, 
the American firms involved in the WCAM settlements are 
only paid if there is a settlement. The costs of settlement 
appear high, but with the exception of Fortis are comparable 
to those in the U.S. Also shaping the incentives of lawyers 
representing the shareholders is the fact that a greater 
proportion of corporate shares in Europe are held by 
institutional investors.282 This should lead to a greater 
alignment of incentives between shareholders and their 
lawyers, as individual shareholders (and the organizations 
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representing them) have a greater incentive to object to 
positions taken by their lawyers which may fail to serve their 
interests to the fullest extent. In settlement negotiations, 
lawyers representing both sides are aware that investors 
have the right to opt-out of a settlement and press an 
individual claim, thereby prompting negotiators on both 
sides to work for a settlement that will be perceived as 
adequate by shareholders.283 Lawyers’ incentives under the 
WCAM may offer some improvement at the margin as 
compared to the American system, but they are largely 
similar. 
D. The Political Economy of the WCAM Securities Settlement 
Comparing the WCAM with the American securities 
fraud class action then reveals an overarching point of 
difference and a number of points of similarity. Because the 
settlement mechanism does not provide a means to sue but 
only to settle with a defendant, leverage in the negotiation 
shifts, often decisively, to the defendant. When the defendant 
does have sufficient incentive to settle, however, similarities 
with the American securities fraud class action emerge. 
Lawyers work for their cut, and the familiar problems of 
circularity and questionable deterrent effect appear. And 
while within the Netherlands itself procedural and 
structural features of the WCAM protect against the ability 
of one shareholder representative to undercut others in a 
reverse auction scenario, on a transnational basis there is 
the possibility that a Dutch settlement can be used to 
undercut potential actions in other jurisdictions. 
A full comparison of the WCAM with the American 
securites fraud class action should also consider the larger 
forces that shaped its development as well as its meaning for 
securities regulation going forward. Since these forces have 
a large admixture of the political, as well as accidental 
factors, in addition to purely economic ones, they fall under 
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the rubric of “political economy” broadly considered. While 
the use of this term by law and economics-minded scholars 
seems to have a pejorative connotation,284 indicating interest 
group, institutional, or other political forces that cause a 
regulatory regime to deviate from the ideal of efficiency, such 
forces are of course operative in shaping any real-world 
regulatory system. Whether construction of a regulatory 
system in the absence of all political-economic forces would 
even be possible, and normatively desireable if it were, is 
beyond the scope of this article. Be that as it may, in addition 
to more traditional economic forces, political and 
jurisprudential considerations, as well as matters of chance, 
have shaped the development of the WCAM’s application to 
securities cases. Political-economic factors are also 
important to the larger significance of the WCAM for 
securities regulation and international financial law.   
It must be remembered that the WCAM was enacted into 
Dutch law to provide a mechanism for settling mass tort 
cases, not securities cases.285 Its application to securities 
claims occurred when Royal Dutch/Shell, which was a 
defendant in Federal District Court in New Jersey, sought 
another forum to resolve claims of non-U.S. shareholders.286  
It was subsequently used by enterprising American lawyers 
seeking a vehicle for mass claims that would not survive in 
American courts under the then-prevailing “conduct and 
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effects” test. Its use in securities cases is serendipitous, 
then—while resourceful lawyers would have likely tested it 
sooner or later, the Dutch Parliament enacting the statute 
does not appear to have considered the application of the law 
to securities cases. On the other hand, the development of 
the securities settlements under the WCAM is not only 
driven by chance but also by economic rationality, since it 
offers a cost-effective means for a corporation to buy closure 
when faced with numerous similar damages claims.287 And 
principles of justice must be counted as a third causal factor. 
In Converium, the court emphasizes the principle of treating 
like cases alike in order to justify its expansive interpretation 
of the jurisdictional law before it.288 This is an important 
jurisprudential principle ultimately grounded in 
deontological reasoning;289 in the legal literature it comes 
under the rubric of “fairness.”290 Furthermore, the 
development of the WCAM as a means of settling securities 
cases can be justified on the grounds of providing “access to 
justice” for shareholders harmed by corporate fraud.291 While 
the American experience with securities fraud class actions 
raises serious questions as to the genuineness of this justice, 
they can and do provide compensation to defrauded 
investors. Beyond that, the class action lawsuit serves an 
important symbolic function in securities regulation.292 
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In addition to factors of chance, economics, and justice, 
the policy justifications used by the courts in key decisions 
have also been important in the development of the WCAM 
as a mechanism for settling securities disputes. As explored 
by Professors Kaal and Painter, the WCAM can be seen as 
an example of forum competition in securities regulation.293 
While in hindsight they appear to overstate the similarity of 
the WCAM securities settlement and its American 
counterpart, because the lack of a means to bring a mass 
claim under the WCAM against an unwilling defendant 
represents a fundamental and often decisive difference with 
the American regime, their theory of forum competition is 
supported by the self-understanding of both the American 
and Dutch courts. As detailed in Part I above, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Morrison believed that it was appropriate 
to hand off foreign securities cases to other jurisdictions that 
it believed had a closer connection to them.294 While Justice 
Scalia’s opinion grounds this position in the doctrine of 
comity, it was also likely influenced by the economic 
argument for rejecting the conduct and effects test presented 
by Professors Choi and Silberman.295 And from the Dutch 
side, Shell Petroleum and Converium show the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals understanding its role as complementary to 
the U.S. courts in the wake of Morrison.296 In the recent 
Petrobras action, the Rotterdam Court of First Instance 
appears to have taken forum competition even further. In 
distinction to Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New 
York, the Rotterdam court ruled that the arbitration 
provision in the Petrobras Bylaws was defective, thereby 
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permitting the claim under DCCP 3:305 to proceed.297 On 
both the part of the Dutch and American courts then, a 
doctrine of complementarity and even competition should be 
counted as a policy choice (albeit one grounded in an 
economic argument) driving the development of this law. 
A further matter of political economy, as pointed out by 
Professor Langevoort and others, has also been important in 
the development of the WCAM.298 This is that the U.S. 
economy contains a significantly higher number of retail 
investors than the European ones. As a consequence, the 
importance of allowing an opt-out class action is greater in 
the U.S. context than in Europe, because a larger proportion 
of the shares of an American company will be held by 
shareholders with negative value claims. In Europe, by 
contrast, a larger proportion of a corporation’s shares will be 
held by investors with an incentive to bring individual claims 
against a corporation they believe has defrauded them. 
Furthermore, in the context of a WCAM settlement, many of 
these institutional investors have an incentive to join a 
shareholder representative such as VEB, or a stichting, and 
to press for a settlement providing substantial compensation. 
A corporation involved in settlement talks under the WCAM 
will therefore be incentivized to offer a generous enough 
settlement to satisfy the shareholder representatives as well 
as shareholders not represented by any foundation who have 
the right to opt-out of any settlement.299 In distinction to the 
American securities class action then, the relatively greater 
concentration of ownership in institutional investors in 
Europe may have the effect of balancing the disparity of 
bargaining power created by the lack of a right to sue 
collectively as well as policing the conduct of the lawyers 
involved on the shareholder side. 
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A final consideration of political economy in the WCAM 
securities cases concerns their significance for the system of 
international securities regulation. The application of the 
WCAM to securities cases appears to be an example of 
Professor Brummer’s “conservation theory of international 
financial law,” under which regulatory power is not 
destroyed but rather transferred.300 As Morrison shut the 
doors of the U.S. courts to foreign securities claims, the 
Netherlands experimented with hosting them. Furthermore, 
insofar as they complement the American securities fraud 
class action, they can be seen as an example of a loose sort of 
convergence in international financial law.301 While the 
pressures toward convergence are less in securities law than 
other areas of financial regulation, and what convergence 
there is is less complete, the past decade has witnessed the 
rapid development of a number of national legal regimes to 
handle securities fraud cases collectively.302 While the Dutch 
experience cautions that problems of circularity and effective 
deterrence will likely remain after a mass claim (or 
settlement) procedure is enacted, considerations of both 
economic efficiency and access to justice have prompted a 
host of countries to implement some form of collective action, 
usually opt-in, for securities fraud cases. In distinction to our 
present anti-global mood, these considerations appear to 
have prompted some convergence in national regimes of 
securities regulation. The American and Dutch regimes are 
just two of these systems, but they are among the most 
important as they represent (in the Dutch case, through the 
operation of the convention on judgments) the largest 
economic blocks of the Western world. 
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CONCLUSION 
The story of Morrison, the WCAM, and the growth of the 
international securities settlement is complex. Morrison is 
driven by both Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential commitments 
as well as the fear that the U.S. courts had become a 
“Shangri-La” for the securities fraud class action.303 For 
scholars who have long voiced criticisms of the U.S. 
securities fraud class action regime on economic grounds, 
Morrison and the WCAM settlement mechanism are both 
something to applaud: Morrison because it closes the 
courtroom doors for those suits with the least obvious 
connection to the United States, and the WCAM because its 
experiment fundamentally reshuffles the balance of power 
between corporations and the legal representatives of the 
shareholders. While economics are not the only driving factor 
in this development, the WCAM does represent an important 
instance of regulatory competition. A close look at the WCAM 
and the settlements under it, however, shows that the Dutch 
regime offers only a crude sort of improvement on its 
American counterpart: its denial of a cause of action in a 
mass claim greatly reduces the amount of cases in the 
system, but those that do settle are still fundamentally 
circular and have questionable deterrent effect. The WCAM 
is an interesting and important development in global 
securities regulation, but investors and corporate issuers will 
have to await a future era less hostile to supra-national 
regulation for a more sophisticated alternative to the 
American securities class action. 
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